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NOTES
Regulation of Electroconvulsive Therapy
Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT)I is a psychiatric procedure that
induces a convulsive seizure in the patient in order to treat severe

depression. 2 Recently, courts, 3 legislatures, 4 and the medical pro-

fession 5 have paid increasing attention to the regulation of ECT.
Their interest has been stimulated by the growing recognition of the
rights of mental patients, 6 the developing role of consent in medical
1. For an extensive analysis of legislative involvement in this area, see Note,
Legislative Control of Shock Treatment, 9 U.S.F.L. REV. 738 (1975). Electroconvulsive therapy has in the past commonly been referred to as "shock treatment." While
insulin coma therapy and other convulsion-inducing therapies may still be occasionally
used by a few practitioners, by far the most widespread form is electroconvulsive
therapy. The term "convulsive" rather than "shock" therapy is preferred by the
medical profession because the convulsion itself is the common element in these
treatments and because "shock treatment" has negative connotations. Such connotations are regarded as unfortunate by advocates of treatment, see, e.g., L. CAMMER, UP
FROM DEPRESSION 153 (1969) ("a disquieting misnomer for an excellent and highly
beneficial treatment method"), but opponents have deliberately emphasized them to
discredit treatment, see, e.g., Adams, You're in for the Shock of Your Life, MADNESS
NETWORK NEws READER 84 (Frank ed. 1974) (pointing to one practitioner who
favors term "electric/shock torture").
2. See Electroconvulsive Therapy in Massachusetts: A Task Force Report, 3
MASS. J. MENTAL HEALTH 4 (1973) [hereinafter cited as MAss. TASK FORCE REPORT];
UNITED STATES DEPT. OF H.E.W., NATL. CLEARINGHOUSE FOR MENTAL HEALTH
INFORMATION, FACTS ABOUT ELECTRO SHOCK THERAPY 74-88 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as CLEARINGHOUSE PAMPHLET]; note 24 infra.
3. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), supplemental
decision, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
affd. in part, remanded in part and revd. in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Wyatt v. Hardin, Civ. Action No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala.,
Feb. 28, 1975); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1206 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Aden
v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1976); Price v. Sheppard, Minn. -, 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976).
4. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 23 (Supp. 1974) (patient has right to
refuse shock treatment and lobotomy); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1716 (1974)
(consent required for surgery and electroshock therapy); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE
LAW § 15.03(b) (4) (McKinney Supp. 1976) (consent required for surgery and shock
treatment); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122.55.6 (1974) (informed consent required for
nonemergency surgery and electroshock treatment); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 426.700 to
426.755 (1975) (informed consent required for psychosurgery and intracranial brain
stimulation); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.370(7) (1974) (patient has right to refuse
lobotomy, nonemergency surgery, and electroshock treatment); California Chapter
1109, Calif. Leg. Service, 1975-76, No. 9, at 4680 (signed by Gov. Brown Sept. 20,
1976).
5. Psychiatrists are now actively involved in ECT research, see note 8 infra,
regulation of ECT through professional organizations, see California Area Branches
Draft ECT Guidelines, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Feb. 6, 1976, at 1, 22-23, and debate over
the merits of the treatment, see 1 CONVULSIVE THERAPY BULL. (1976).
6. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). See generally Advances in
Mental Health: A Case for the Right to Refuse Treatment, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 354
(1975).
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transactions, 7 and the results of recent scientific research on the
efficacy and consequences of ECT.8
Regulation of ECT has generally focused on whether the patient
or his representative9 effectively consented to the treatment. The
highly intrusive nature of ECT ° and the unique circumstances of
those patients who are likely to receive it" create particularly difficult legal issues concerning the validity of the patient's consent.
This Note will examine the various methods that are available to
protect the rights of patients for whom ECT is proposed. After
briefly explaining the nature of the therapy, the Note will discuss
the efficacy of judicial remedies with respect to both competent and
incompetent patients. It will argue that, because of the peculiar
nature of ECT, special procedures that ensure the existence of consent to state-administered ECT may be constitutionally required. It
will then address specific procedures legislatively enacted by several
states for the regulation of ECT' 2 and will assess their constitutional
limitations,"3 with emphasis upon the problem that a regulatory
scheme, in its effort to protect patients from unconsented therapy,
7. See Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. RPv. 340, 340-48 (1974); Schneyer, Informed Consent and the
Danger of Bias in the Formation of Medical Disclosure Practices, 1976 Wis. L. REv.

124, 148-55.
8. New studies focusing on the problems of memory loss include: May, Tuma,
Yale, Potepan & Dixon, Schizophrenia-A Follow-up Study of Results of Treatment,
33 ARcmvns GEN. PSYCH. 481 (1976); Squire & Chace, Memory Functions Six to
Nine Months After Electroconvulsive Therapy, 32 ARcHIvEs GEN. PSYCH. 1557

(1975).
9. Note that in cases of total incompetency, a guardian, state-approved review
panel, or other representative may be allowed to consent for the patient. This
substituted consent is discussed in text at note 143 infra. When the term "patient" is
used in this Note, it includes those persons or bodies qualified to give substituted
consent.
10. See text at notes 81-82 infra.

11. See text at notes 109-30 infra.
12. See note 4 supra.

13. It should be pointed out that, while this Note focuses particularly on ECT, the
interest of mental patients in being free from unwanted psychiatric treatment extends
to other forms of therapy as well. An analysis of ECT regulation may serve as a
model for regulation of other psychiatric treatments. For example, increasing
attention is being given to the use and effects of psychotropic medications. See
Marker, Phenothiazines and the Mentally Retarded: Institutional Drug-Abuse?, in
MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT, SuMMARY oF AcTIvrrinEs 1 (March 1975). The

value of ECT as a model treatment is more apparent when one compares public
reactions to "shock" and "chemo" therapy. Our culture is so accustomed to the
frequency, ease, and acceptability of taking drugs that the misuse of drugs may seem a
less serious area for mbntal health regulation. Yet by different physiological mechanisms, ECT and psychotropic drugs appear to present similar potential harms to
patients. See Bomstein, The Forcible Administration of Drugs to Prisoners and
Mental Patients, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 379 (1975); Note, Mental Health-The
Right to Refuse Drug Therapy Under Emergency Restraint Statutes, 11 Nsw ENo.
L. REV. 509 (1976).
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may interfere with the right of patients to consent to privately administered ECT.

I.

THE ADMINISTRATION, PURPOSES, AND

ECT
ECT is the term generally used to describe several types of
psychiatric treatment,' 4 all of which involve inducing in the patient
a convulsive seizure similar to a grand mal epileptic attack. 5 The
patient does not eat for four hours prior to the convulsion. Sedatives
may be provided before treatment, but usually no drug therapy
occurs. One-half hour before the convulsion, atropine, a preanesthetic medication that reduces the risk of suffocation by decreasing
the production of saliva, is furnished.' 8 A fast-acting barbiturate
anesthetic is then injected so that the patient will feel neither the
muscle contractions that precede muscle relaxation nor the
unpleasant sensation of respiratory arrest.' 7 Electrodes are attached' 8 to the patient's temples' 9 and a current that ranges between
seventy and 130 volts is administered for 0.1 to 0.5 seconds.20 The
EFFECTS OF

14. These are pharmacological shock or convulsive therapy, insulin coma treatment, and electroconvulsive therapy. See Krouner, Shock Therapy and Psychiatric
Malpractice: The Legal Accommodation to a Controversial Treatment, 2 FOR. SCI.
397, 423 nn.11 & 12 (1973). See also L. KALINOWSKY & H. HIppius, PHARMACOLOGICAL CONVULSIVE AND OTHER SOMATIC TREATMENTS IN PSYCHIATRY 269 n.3 (1.969).

15. For general descriptions of ECI" treatment, see Kalinowsky, The Convulsive
Therapies in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1279-85 (A. Freedmand & H.
Kaplan eds. 1967).
16. See Krouner, supra note 14, at 402.
17. See id.
18. To increase conductivity and prevent bums, graphite jelly is applied to the
temples. See Kalinowsky, supra note 15, at 1279.
19. In unilateral ECT, electric current is applied by placement of one electrode to
the nondominant hemisphere of the brain. Bilateral ECT employs two electrodes,
one on each temple. The distinction is significant. Unilateral treatment results in a
lessening of posttreatment memory loss and confusion. See Karliner, Present Status
of Unilateral Shock Treatments, 4 BEHAVIORAL NEuROPSYCH. 2-4, 12 (1973); Abrams,
Recent Clinical Studies of ECT, 4 SEMINARS IN PSYCH. 3-5 (1972); Dombush,
Memory and Induced ECT Convulsions, 4 SEMINARS IN PSYCH. 47-49 (1972).
However, a greater number of unilateral treatments than bilateral is necessary to
achieve therapeutic benefit. See CLEARINGHOUSE PAMPHLET, supra note 2, at 9. For
example, unilateral treatments may be given daily but bilateral is rarely administered
more than three times a week. See MASS. TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 4. Unilateral

ECT may involve a trade-off of reduced memory impairment for the other risks
implicit in a greater number of treatments. One psychiatrist reports preference for
bilateral placement despite its lessened clinical effectiveness because the patient is
spared the additional anesthetic risks of the more frequent unilateral treatments. See
Gabriel, ECT as the Treatment of Choice, WORLD MED. NEWS Rv., Nov. 1974, at
68.

Electrode placement may thus determine the degree or nature of posttreatment

impairment. This may make especially significant the physician's disclosure of
dangers to the patient and the patient's participation in choosing which risks he may
prefer to accept.
20. F. REDLICH & D. FREEDMAN, THE THEORY AND PRACICE OF PSYCHIATRY 337

(1966).
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seizure, the therapeutic agent, lasts between thirty and fifty
seconds. 2
The patient remains totally unconscious for a few

minutes after the convulsion; full consciousness is regained in five
to thirty minutes.22
This procedure is most widely used to treat severe depression 21

and schizophrenia. 24

Although there is evidence, 25 albeit dis-

puted, 20 that it has at least some positive effect, there is little agreement as to the process by which ECT ameliorates these conditions.

One theory posits that ECT works by producing a regression of behavior to infantile levels, which enables the patient's personality to
be restructured. 28

Other explanations are that it causes amnesia

which helps repress stressful and unpleasant experiences,
patient,3"

induces fear in the

2

that it

that it makes the patient feel he is

being punished, thereby assuaging his conscience, 3 ' or that it stimu-

lates certain chemicals in the brain.3 2 None of these theories, how21. The seizure or convulsion consists of the body shaking and twitching and of a
transient apnea or loss of breath. D. MCCARTHY & K. BORRIN, MEDICAL TREATMENT
OF MENTAL DISEASE: THE ToxiC AND ORGANIC BASIS OF PSYCHIATRY 593-96 (1955).
When muscle relaxants are used, however, the violent shaking of the body is not
experienced by the patient; the only observable motion during convulsion may be a
twitching of the toes. See T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, MODERN PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT
639 (1971).
22. D. MCCARTHY & K. BORRIN, supra note 21, at 594.
23. The medical illness for which ECT is most widely recognized as appropriate
is involutional melancholia, the depressed phase of manic-depressive illness, sometimes called psychotic depressive reaction. See E. ROSEN, R. Fox & I. GREGORY,
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

433 (2d ed. 1972).

As emphasized by the Massachusetts

Task Force Report, "the use of the term 'depressed' by the patient should not
immediately be construed to imply the presence of an affective disorder. Descriptive
phrases such as 'non-functional' or 'depressed person' are insufficient to justify the use
of ECT." MASS. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 19.
24. Sullivan, Treatment of Acute Schizophrenia: The Place of ECT, 35 DISEASES
OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM

467-69 (1974).

Although agreement exists that ECT is

effective in treating wildly destructive or catatonic patients by controlling behavior so
that other treatments (psychotropic drugs and psychotherapy) can be used, there is
no consensus on any other role for ECT in *the treatment of schizophrenia. See
MASS. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 19.
25. See L. CAMMER, supra note 1, at 153; MASS. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
2, at 19.
26. See, e.g., Friedberg, Electroshock Therapy: Let's Stop Blasting the Brain,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Aug., 1975, at 18.
27. See Miller, Psychological Theories of E.C.T.: A Review, 113 BRIT. J. PSYCH.,
301, 301-11 (1967).
28. Cameron, Lohrenz & Handcock, The Depatterning Treatment of Schizophrenia, 3 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCH. 65 (1962); Murillo & Exner, The Effects of Regressive
ECT with Process Schizophrenics, 130 AM. J. PSYCH., 269, 269-73 (1973).
29. See Miller, supra note 27, at 303.
30. See id. at 304-05.
31. See L. KALINowSKY &H. HIPPIUs, supra note 14, at 375.
32. See Abrams & Taylor, Electroconvulsive Therapy and the Diencephalon: A
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ever, has been widely accepted.3" This inability to discern the
manner in which ECT works 4 makes it difficult for physicians to
predict accurately which patients will benefit from the treatment. 35

A major problem with ECT therapy is that physical complications
can result from the convulsion. Bone fractures and dislocations
have

been

a frequent

consequence

of the

violent seizure.

6

Although muscle relaxants are now often administered before the
convulsion to reduce the risk of fractures,' 7 it is still accepted medi-

cal practice to administer ECT without them. 38

cardiovascular complications have also occurred.3 9

Respiratory and
However, care-

ful pretreatment investigation for physicial weaknesses, 40 and the
Preliminary Report, 15 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCH. 233, 233-36 (1974); Fink, The
Therapeutic Process in ECT, 4 SEMINARS IN PSYCH. 39, 42-44 (1972); Hamadah,
Holmes, Barker, Hartman & Parke, Effects of Electric Convulsive Therapy on
Urinary Excretion of 3', 5' Cyclic Adenosine Monophosphate, 1972 BRrr. MED. J.
439, 439-41 (1972).
33. Ketty, Biochemical and Neurochemical Effects of Electroconvulsive Shock, in
PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF CONVULSIVE THERAPY 285, 292 (M. Fink, S. Ketty, J. McGaugh &
T. Williams eds. 1974).
34. See T. DiERE & H. JARECKI, supra note 21, at 641-42.
35. Id. at 645. But see Mendels, The Prediction of Response to Electroconvulsive
Therapy, 124 AM. J. PSYCH. 153 (1967).
36. See Krouner, supra note 14, at 402-03.
37. See id. at 403.
38. See Pettis v. State Dept. of Hosps., - La. App. -, -,
336 So. 2d 521, 528
(1976); Foxlger v. State, 23 Misc. 2d 933, 934, 203 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (Sup. Ct.
1960). In these cases the plaintiffs suffered fractures following the administration of
unmodified ECT. No negligence was found on the part of the treating physicians
because the absence of muscle relaxants was an accepted medical technique of ECT
administration. Practitioners who give ECT without muscle relaxants argue that
their use entails too many independent risks.
39. See Krouner, supra note 14, at 402. Other negative consequences include
amenorrhea, see Michael, The Menstrual Cycle and Recovery During Shock Treatment, 15 DISEASES OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 342 (1954), permanent epileptic
disorders, see Assael, CentrencephalicEpilepsy Induced by Electro Convulsive Treatment, 23 ELECTROENCEPHALIC CLINICAL NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 193 (1967), aggravation
of preexisting lung disease, see Krouner, supra note 14, at 402-03 n.129, and sexual
disturbances, see Weinstein, Sexual Disturbances After Brain Injury, 8 MEDICAL
ASPECTS OF HUMAN SExuALITY 10 (1974).
40. Osteoporosis, old age liver disease, recent cerebral hemorrhage, severe debilitating illness, and recent heart or lung disease have been cited as physical weaknesses
that make ECT administration particularly dangerous. See MASS. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 11, One study, however, has indicated that ECT can be safely
administered to patients with a history of heart trouble. See Ballenger, Electroconvulsive Therapy and Cardiac Pacemakers, 14 PSYCHOSOMATICS 233-34 (1973). Pretreatment screening should also include considerations of the interaction between
other medications the patient may have taken and drugs administered as part of the
ECT procedure. See Chessen, Geha & Salzman, ECT, Glaucoma, and Prolonged
Apnea, 35 DISEASES OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 152 (1974). See also Unrecognized
Adult Phenylketonuria, 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 395, 397 (1973) (two women
inappropriately given ECT when ferric chloride test would have revealed an undiscovered metabolic disorder).
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use of muscle relaxants, barbiturate anesthetics, and oxygen have

greatly reduced these complications.

1

Of far greater concern are the mental complications of ECT-par-

ticularly disorientation and loss of memory. Disorientation may be
so complete that the patient will not remember the names of people
around him and, in rare cases, his occupation.42 Such confusion has
been reported to persist for as long as six months after treatment.4"
This effect may actually be a necessary part of the therapy, for some
clinicians believe that -the extent of the treatment's eventual success
is directly proportional to the amount of temporary disorientation."
That loss of memory is also a frequent result of ECT is not seriously
questioned.

However, the scope and length of the loss is a subject

of vigorous debate within the psychiatric profession. 45 Total amnesia typically occurs throughout the entire course of a series of
treatments.4 ' Some authorities state that memory usually returns
within a few weeks of the final treatment; 47 however, there are also
41. See Krouner, supra note 14, at 402.
42. T. Da-rRE & H. JARECKi, supra note 21, at 641-42. Kalinowsky suggests that,
because of the problem presented by the patient's increasing confusion during the
course of treatment, physicians should "warn the relatives most carefully to keep the
patient away not only from friends (who, seeing him in this confused state, might
draw wrong conclusions as to his mental capacities) but from his business, where he
might do much harm without realizing it." L. KALINOWSKY & H. HIPPIus, supra note
14, at 184.
43. Ulett, Smith & Gleser, Evaluation of Convulsive and Subconvulsive Shock
Therapies Utilizing a Control Group, 112 AM. J. PSYCH. 795 (1956).
44. Robitscher, A Duty to Desist in Informed Consent: When Can It Be
Withdrawn?, 2 HASTINGS REPORT 10, 11 (1972).
45. Zamora & Kaelbling, Memory and Electroconvulsive Therapy, 12 AM. J.
PSYCH. 546 (1965). The accounts of psychiatrists and patients concerning memory
loss differ. For example, Kalinowsky states: "Neurotics with hypochondrical tendencies complain more often than other patients of not remembering names and places,
of difficulty in concentrating or of forgetting more easily. All patients who remain
unimproved after ECT are inclined to complain bitterly of their memory difficulties."
L.

KALINOWSKY & P.

HOCH, SHOCK TREATMENTS,

MATIC TREATMENTS IN PSYCHIATRY 139 (1952).

PSYCHOSURGERY AND

See L.

CAMMER,

OTHER SO-

supra note 1, at

157.
Yet descriptions by patients suggest that memory loss is real. As one patient has
stated: "I'd lost the body of knowledge that constituted my professional skill ....
I'd lost my experience, my knowing. But it was worse than that. I felt that I'd lost
myself." Roueche, Annals of Medicine: As Empty as Eve, THE NEW YORKER, Sept.
9, 1974, at 96. Ernest Hemingway is reported to have commented after receiving a
series of ECT treatments at the Mayo Clinic: "Well, what is the sense of ruining my
head and erasing my memory, which is my capital, and putting me out of business? It
was a brilliant cure but we lose the patient
A PERSONAL MEMOIR 308 (1966).

....

"

A. HOTCHNER, PAPA HEMINGWAY:

Whether memory loss can be traced to physiological or psychological causes
may have greater scientific than legal significance. In any case, physicians should be
required to warn the patient of the risk of amnesia as part of obtaining informed consent. See text at note 118 infra.
46. Kalinowsky, The Convulsive Therapies, in TREATING MENTAL ILLNESS 349-50

(A. Freedman & H. Kaplan eds. 1972).
47. See T. DE'RE & H. JAREcti, supra note 19, at 642-43.

Electroconvulsive Therapy
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reports of permanent memory impairment. 48 Memory loss may extend to events occuring before4 9 or after50 the treatment. Although
other serious mental complications of ECT are not thoroughly documented, there is some evidence indicating that ECT may cause brain
damage 5 ' and impairment of learning ability.52
I.

JUDICIAL REGULATION OF
ELECTROCONVULSIVE THERAPY

Although some states have comprehensive legislation that controls
48. See Roueche, supra note 45, at 84; Goldman, Gomer & Templer, Long Term
Effects of Electroconvulsive Therapy Upon Memory and Perceptual-Motor Performance, 28 J. CLINICAL PSYCH. 33. Studies indicate that the placement of
electrodes can significantly affect the duration and type of memory loss that occurs.
See d'Elia, Memory Studies in Electroconvulsive Therapy with Different Electrode
Placements, 37 BRAIN RESEARCH 364 (1972); note 19 supra.
49. This is called retrograde amnesia. See Squires, Slater & Chace, Retrograde
Amnesia: Temporal Gradient in Very Long Term Memory Following Electroconvulsive Therapy, 187 SCIENCE 77-79 (1975).
50. This is called anterograde amnesia. Dornbush & Williams, Memory and
ECT, in PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF CONVULSIVE THERAPY 199, 201 (M. Fink, S. Ketty, J.
McGaugh & T. Williams eds. 1974). Anterograde amnesia may be classified not as
memory loss but as an impairment of the ability to learn. See note 76 infra.
51. The relation between ECT and brain damage is uncertain. The Massachusetts Task Force on Electroconvulsive Therapy reported:
Despite the assertions of some authors that ECT may produce a subtle form of
brain damage, and that they have seen several patients with histories of excellent
educational achievements demonstrate subnormal intelligence quotients after
multiple courses of ECT, most authors do not believe that permanent brain damage occurs when a reasonable number of treatments are properly administered
with sufficient oxygen. It is apparent, however, that a definitive answer is not
available regarding the likelihood of permanent brain damage resulting from an
unusually large number of treatments.
MAss. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5. One study nonetheless suggests that,
because ECT may have a local effect on the brain structure immediately under the
electrodes, electrodes should be placed over cortical areas not directly related to
crucial mental functions and that placement should be individualized depending on
the patient's occupation: "For example for a carpenter who must earn his living by
skeletomuscular activities, i.e., nonverbal activities, unilateral electrode placement
over the dominant hemisphere may be optimal, even though that particular placement
carries a greater risk of loss of verbal memory function." McGaugh & Williams,
Neurophysiological and Behavioral Effects of Convulsive Phenomena, in THE PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF CONVULSIVE THERAPY 279, 282 (M. Fink, S. Ketty, J. McGaugh & T.
Williams eds. 1974). Serious questions are raised by the repeated admonitions in
psychiatric literature concerning the relationship between electrode placement and
patient occupation. Just as manual capabilities of a carpenter should be preserved,
"one should also be cautious with the man who uses a highly trained memory in the
exercise of his profession." W. SARGANT & E. SLATER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PHYSICAL METHODS OF TREATMENT IN PSYCHIATRY 73 (1972); Memory Disturbances
After ECT-A Major or Minor Side Effect?, 134 INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS Ser. 161
(1967) (Academy of Psychosomatic Medicine).
52. Some interference with the ability to store information received by the patient
after treatment has been reported. See Squire & Miller, Diminution of Anterograde
Amnesia Following Electroconvulsive Therapy, 125 BIUr. J. PSYCH. 490, 490-95
(1974). Again, the placement of the electrodes seems related to the nature of the
learning impairment which can follow treatment. Berent, Cohen & Silverman,
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the administration of ECT,5 3 most patients must still rely on the

courts for protection. Because ECT is a form of medical treatment
that involves a physical invasion of the patient's body, traditional tort

doctrines, which are adequately discussed elsewhere, 4 apply: If the
patient does not consent to the treatment, or if he is not fully advised

of its risks, an action for damages is available. It is being increasingly recognized, however, that a patient who receives ECT
without his consent is not limited to remedies in tort; such medical
practices may violate the patient's constitutional rights as well.
With the exception of those cases where ECT is administered in
private settings on an inpatient or outpatient basis, the state is usually
sufficiently involved with the administration of ECT to satisfy the

Constitution's state action requirement.5 5 This section of the Note
contends that the administration of ECT by the state to a noncon-

senting patient

6

violates several of his constitutional rights.

7

In

order to give such treatment, the state therefore must show either

that the patient has effectively consented to the medical care, thereby waiving his right to the constitutional protections violated by the

forcible medical intervention, or that it possesses a sufficiently strong
Changes in Verbal and Nonverbal Learnings Following a Single Left or Right
Unilateral Electroconvulsive Treatment, 10 BIOLOGICAL PSYCH. 95, 95-100 (1975).

53. See statutes cited note 4 supra.
54. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 101-05 (4th ed. 1971).

55. It is recognized that the state action requirement limits the class of protected
patients. Three levels of state involvement can be discerned by categorizing patients
according to admission status and place of treatment. Arguably in the case of
involuntarily committed patients, whether to a public or private hospital, the state has
been sufficiently active in bringing about the individual's status as a patient to meet
the fourteenth amendment standard. The next level would be patients voluntarily hospitalized in state institutions. The state's involvement is not in securing the hospitalization but in actually administering the therapy, a degree of activity sufficient to come
within requirements for state action. The third group of patients are those who
receive ECT in private hospitals or clinics, either on an in- or out-patient basis. It
can be argued that a private hospital that receives state or federal funding to a
significant degree or operates under governmental regulation may fall within the
parameters of state action. See Note, Judicial Review of Private Hospital Activities,
75 MICH. L. REv. 445 (1976); Note, State Action in the Health Field, 1975 Wis. L.
R1v. 1188.
56. This section focuses on the validity of the consent of patients who are competent. Of course, many patients are legally incompetent and incapable of giving consent. In these situations, representatives of the patient-relative, guardian, or a
medical, state-sanctioned panel-must give consent. The implications of so-called
substituted consent is discussed at note 208 infra. Substituted consent must also
satisfy the constitutional standards for waiver when the treatment is administered by
the state; of course, if the patient is competent, there is no reason to look to substituted consent.
57. It is well settled that the competent individual has a right to refuse to submit
to certain actions being performed upon his body. As stated by Justice Cardozo,
"[elvery human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body .......
Shloendorff v. Society of the N.Y. Hosp.,
211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S.
1, 17 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

December 1976]

Electroconvulsive Therapy

interest that justifies treating a nonconsenting patient. It is argued
that no sufficient state interest is adequately served by forcing ECT
upon patients who are competent to make a rational choice about

treatment. However, special problems exist concerning the knowledge and voluntariness of these patients-that is, whether they
have, in fact, given consent. The state should thus be obligated to
provide some mechanism to verify that the purported consent satis-

fies the constitutional standards for waiver. This Note further maintains that the state, in many instances, will possess a sufficient interest in treating incompetent patients who lack the capacity to consent
to ECT. It is suggested, however, that a review mechanism is also
necessary in these instances to ensure ,that the intrusion upon the
patients and the risk of harm are justified by the treatment's benefits.
A.

Constitutional Implications of State Administratiori of ECT to
Nonconsenting Patients

The right to refuse unwanted ECT is derived
primarily from the
58
constitutional rights of free speech and privacy.
58. Additional support for the right to refuse treatment can be found in the first
amendment's protection of religious exercise. In Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971), the Second Circuit held that, absent a
judicial finding of incompetence, the forced treatment in a mental institution over the
objections of the patient, a Christian Scientist, unconstitutionally interfered with her
religious beliefs. The Court could find no compelling state interest to override
Winter's first amendment right of freedom of religion. The applicability of this
holding to the nonconsensual administration of ECT seems clear: A patient whose
religious beliefs prevent medical intervention should be allowed to refuse medical or
somatic psychiatric treatment. There are, however, both limitations and extensions
of the right to refuse treatment when based on the right of freedom of religion. See
text at notes 87-89 infra. It has been suggested that the right to refuse treatment
based on religious protection should apply not only to those patients who belong to an
organized religion but also to any person who has a sincere and deeply felt opposition
to psychiatric drugs. See Bomstein, The Forcible Administration of Drugs to Prisoners and Mental Patients,9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 379, 385 (1975).
Another potential constitutional basis for regulation of ECT is-the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. If a treatment were given
solely for punitive reasons, the requirements of the eighth amendment would most
certainly apply. It is very probable that this amendment is relevant only in those
cases where the treatment is used illegitimately. It is nonetheless noteworthy that the
mere characterization of a procedure as treatment or rehabilitation has been held not
to insulate it from eighth amendment scrutiny. See Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d
1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 1973); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F.
Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972). Courts have found eighth amendment violations in the
use of vomit-inducing and tranquilizing drugs outside a psychotherapeutic setting. See
Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139-40 (8th Cir. 1973); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F.
Supp. 451, 455 (N.D. Ind. 1972), affd., 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974).
Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected a plaintiff's claim that the ECT
he had received was cruel and unusual punishment. The court found that "the decision to administer electroshock therapy was not triggered by any single incident nor
did it involve an isolated treatment, both of which would be more characteristic of
punishment," thus acknowledging in dicta circumstances under which an eighth

Michigan Law Review

[.Vol. 75:363

Freedom of expression as protected by the first amendment
encompasses the right of an individual to communicate.5 Similarly,
thought, or the action or process of thinking, has also been protected
under that amendment. 60

Both communication and thought would

not occur without a "logically prior antecedent," which is widely
referred to as the process of mentation. 61

Mentation has been

defined as "a person's power to generate thought, ideas, and mental
activity."6 2 It describes the mental activity 'that precedes thought
and refers to the mental process itself.6 3 Extending the scope of
amendment claim might succeed. Price v. Sheppard, - Minn. -, -, 239 N.W.2d
905, 909 (1976).
There is little question that electroconvulsive therapy has been used inappropriately. See Abse & Ewing, Transference and Countertransferencein Somatic Therapies, 123 J. NEavous & MENTAL DisEASE 32, 38 (1956) ("It is, of course, the frequent
experience of a physician in a state hospital to be approached by a nurse who suggests
a 'few shocks' for a patient because he has been fighting, resistive, uncooperative or
even merely obscene in his talk."). The possibility of a perhaps unconsciously
retributive aspect to ECT administration is suggested by one study which found that
those patients chosen for ECT were highest on a doctor-patient tension level scale
given to the administering psychiatrist. Rabiner, Reiser, Silverberg, Schacht &
Gralnick, Method of Assaying Doctor-PatientTensions: Its Application in Assessing
the Role of Those Tensions in the Choice of Electroshock, 4 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCH.
553, 560 (1961).
Finally, ECT may occasionally be used not solely as punishment but as punishment for the purposes of treatment. See Opton, Psychiatric Violence Against
For
Prisoners: When Therapy is Punishment, 45 Miss. L.J. 605, 644 (1974).
example, ECT could be used in a program of aversive conditioning, a technique of
behavior modification involving forms of punishment to discourage negative behavior.
For an extensive bibliography on recent legal and medical studies on behavior
modification, see 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 101-11 (1975).
There are reports suggesting that ECT has been used both for behavior modification and for control purposes without supplementary psychiatric treatment. For
example, unmodified .ECT was given by an American psychiatrist to 120 patients in a
Vietnamese mental hospital who refused to work. "Gradually there began to be
evident improvement in the behavior of the patients . . . and [in] the number of
patients volunteering for work. This latter was a result of ECI"s alleviating
schizophrenic or depressive thinking and effect with some. With others it was simply
a result of their dislike or fear of ECT." Cotter, Operant Conditioning in a
Vietnamese Mental Hospital, 124 AM. J. PSYCH. 24-25 (1967). Because such use of
ECT has an element of both punishment and treatment, it has been suggested that the
treatment element controls making the eighth amendment inapplicable. See, e.g., Peek
v. Accone, 288 F. Supp. 329, 337 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (dismissing petitioners' cruel and
unusual punishment claim based on the forceful administration of thorazine because
the officers "were not attempting to punish or harm the petitioner"). Others have
urged that the courts should extend full constitutional rights when therapy is used as
punishment. See Opton, supra, at 644. See also Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877
(9th Cir. 1973).
59. See Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the
Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 256 n.51 (1974).
60. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
61. Shapiro, supra note 59, at 258-59.

62. Id. at 255-56.
63. The distinction between control of thought and mentation is suggested by the
California Court of Appeal in its description of the effect of the bill regulating ECT:
"Here the state has sought to control neither what is thought by mental patients, nor
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first amendment protection to include mentation simply recognizes
that each step in the sequence of producing a communication is

necessary

and should therefore be protected under the first

amendment's right of expression.
This was precisely the conclusion in Kaimowitz v. Department of
Mental Health, 4 in which a Michigan circuit court prevented experi-

mental psychosurgery on a mental patient who was incapable of
giving consent.

The court reasoned that "if the First Amendment

protects the freedom to express ideas, it necessarily follows that it
must protect the freedom to generate ideas. Without the latter
protection, the former is meaningless." 65 The interference with the

patient's mental process that accompanies ECT treatment is
substantial.

As with psychosurgery, the very purpose of the

treatment is to change the nature of mental activity by organic
means.

Mental disorientation and loss of memory are frequent

consequences." 6 Thus ECT-as well as similar treatments-should

be considered violative of the first amendment's right of 67
free

expression when it is administered to a nonconsenting patient.

The right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is also protected

by the constitutional right of privacy. This right was deemed "fundamental" in Griswold v. Connecticut,68 in which the Court invalidated
how they think.

Rather, the state is attempting to regulate the use of procedures

which touch upon thought processes in significant ways

....

"

Aden v. Younger, 57

Cal. App. 3d 662, 679, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 546 (1976).
64. No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Mich., filed July 10, 1973, 2 Prison L. Rptr. 433
(1973).
65. 2 Prison L. Rptr. at 478. That interference with mentation triggers constitutional protections was also recognized in Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir.
1973). There, the Ninth Circuit found that the administration of a "fright drug" as
part of a behavior modification program to which the patient had not consented could
raise "serious constitutional questions respecting . . . impermissible tinkering with the
mental processes." 477 F.2d at 878.
66. See text at notes 42-52 infra. One characteristic of psychosurgery seen by the
Kaimowitz court as impairment of the power to generate ideas was "the deadening of
memory." 2 Prison L. Rptr. at 478. As the court in Aden v. Younger acknowledged
regarding ECT, "[t]he extent of memory loss and the risk of permanent memory loss
are not fully known or agreed upon, but the fact of memory loss is not questioned." 57
Cal. App. 3d 662, 672, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 541 (1976).
67. One might argue that an incompetent patient-one who lacks the capacity to
express his thoughts-cannot take advantage of constitutional protections, since his
thoughts are not significant enough to warrant protection. This argument, however,
suffers from several fundamental weaknesses. First, an incompetent patient may well
have mentation or thoughts, though he is unable to express them. Second, the decision
that one is incompetent itself deserves constitutional protection; otherwise, a fully
competent patient may have his rights infringed when he is erroneously deemed
incompetent and consequently treated against his will. To give this decision constitutional significance is tantamount to saying that a mental patient has a right not to be
presumed incompetent. Thus, it is appropriate to recognize that all mental patientseven though some are wholly incompetent-enjoy the constitutional rights discussed
in this section.
68. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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a state statute proscribing the use of contraceptives by married

persons.

Since Griswold, recognition of the right of privacy has

sustained the use of contraceptives by unmarried persons,"0 the

possession of obscene materials in one's own home, 70 and the obtaining of an abortion within the first trimester of pregnancy. 7I Although it is difficult to discern a precise rationale that controls all
of these cases, 2 it is nonetheless apparent that their underlying
values would seem to compel a finding that the state's administration

of ECT to nonconsenting patients violates the right of privacy.
The fundamental value that the Court apparently considers to be

supportive of the privacy right is the interest in individual autonomy,
or the "right to be left alone. ' 73 The "dignitary quality" of each
individual requires that he have spheres of activity free from govern-

mental intrusion. 74 Generally, the Court finds a right of privacy in
areas traditionally considered "personal." For example, the fourth
amendment has been held to protect those areas for which the

person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy.'7 Justice Douglas
has argued for "the autonomous control over the development and
expression of one's intellect, interest, tastes and' 77 personality" 70 and
"the freedom to care for one's health and person.

It is difficult to imagine an aspect of the human condition more
personal and more deserving of protection than an individual's
mental processes. The court in Kaimowitz reached this conclusion:
There is no privacy more deserving of constitutional protection
than that of one's mind. . . . If one is not protected in his thoughts,
behavior, personality and identity, then the right of privacy becomes
meaningless. i[I]n the hierarchy of values, it is more important to
69. See Baird v. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
70. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
71. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
72. Professor Kurland notes that, because the constitutional concept of privacy is
undefined, it is consequently confused with "a great many other notions that are
related but should not be identified with it, because such identification both distorts
and demeans it." Kurland, The Private I: Some Reflections on Privacy and the
Constitution, 10 U. Cmi. REc. 107, 117 (1976). The Supreme Court itself has noted
that its privacy decisions, "while defying categorical description, deal generally with
substantive aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment." Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713
(1976) (no privacy right invaded by distribution to local merchants of a flyer
containing a mugshot of the plaintiff under the heading "Active Shoplifters").
73. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
74. See Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 962, 971 (1964). See generally T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FRa-noM OF EXPRESSION 544-45 (1970).
75 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
76. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
77. 410 U.S. at 213.
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protect one's mental processes than to protect even the privacy of
78

the marital bed.
Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court also stated that the adminis-

tration of ECT to a nonconsenting patient infringes that person's
privacy: "At the core of the [U.S. Supreme Court's] privacy decisions

in our judgment, is the concept of personal autonomy-the notion
that the Constitution reserves to the individual, free of governmental

intrusion, certain fundamental decisions about how he or she will
conduct his or her life."79 The court characterized the impact of a
decision to receive ECT as "unquestionably great, for the result is
the alteration of the patient's personality."" °
The characteristic of ECT and other similar treatments that courts

evaluate to determine whether the privacy right has been violated
is "intrusiveness." '

In essence, intrusiveness measures the extent

to which a treatment alters the behavior and thought processes of
the patient. Because ECT can result in disorientation, memory loss

or impairment of cognitive abilities,"2 it is not surprising that such
treatment has been characterized by one court as "one of the most
intrusive forms of treatment." '
Thus, the effectiveness of consent
to a highly intrusive treatment such as ECT must be more critically

scrutinized than consent to other kinds of medical interventions since
78. 2 Prison L. Rptr. at 477-78.
79. Price v. Sheppard, - Minn. -, -, 239 N.W.2d 905, 911 (1976).
80. - Minn. at -, 239 N.W.2d at 911.
81. See Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 673, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 543
(1976); Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 2 Prison L. Rptr. at 478; Price
v. Sheppard, - Minn. at -, 239 N.W.2d at 910-11. It is useful to examine the
meaning of "intrusive" or at least to ascertain what constitutes an intrusive treatment.
Intrusiveness in the psychiatric sense involves a physical interference with the patient
for the purpose of altering his thought or behavior processes. As the term has been
used, both physical and psychological invasion appear to be necessary for a treatment
to qualify as being intrusive. Shapiro offers six criteria which make up the concept
of intrusiveness:
(i) the extent to which the effects of the therapy upon mentation are reversible;
(ii) the extent to which the resulting psychic state is "foreign," "abnormal," or
"unnatural" for the person in question, rather than simply a restoration of his
prior psychic state (this is closely related to the "magnitude" or "intensity" of
the change);
(iii) the rapidity with which the effects occur;
(iv) the scope of the change in the total "ecology" of the mind's functions;
(v) the extent to which one can resist acting in ways impelled by the psychic
effects of the therapy; and
(vi) the duration of the change.
Shapiro, supra note 59, at 262. The alteration of mental process or "intrusion into
one's intellect" triggers the protection of privacy. But one's mental processes can be
altered by countless nonintrusive stimuli every day. Hence the physical component is
necessary to distinguish volitional and nonorganic changings of the mind from those
that will occur organically as a result of treatment administered without regard to the
patient's desire. Id. See also id. at 257 n.53.
82. See notes 42-51 supra and accompanying text.
83. Price v. Sheppard, - Minn. -, -, 239 N.W.2d 905, 912 (1976).
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the effect of the bodily invasion is to reorder, subdue, alter, or blunt
the individual's mental process. The California Court of Appeal
recently recognized this facet of mind-altering treatment: "[W]e
need not decide whether the decision to undergo medical treatment
is deserving of constitutional protection in and of itself . . because

the right to privacy so clearly includes privacy of the mind." 84 Although the future course of the scope of the privacy right appears

uncertain, 85 it appears that the right is sufficiently broad to protect
nonconsenting patients from state-administered ECT.80
84. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 679, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 546 (1976).
85. For example, the Supreme Court recently upheld a Virginia statute criminalizing homosexual relations between consenting adult males. Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). The district court opinion characterized homosexuality as being "obviously no portion of marriage, home or family life." 403 F. Supp.
1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975).
86. An alternative constitutional basis for finding a right to be free from
unwanted medical treatment that is closely related to the privacy-right analysis is
substantive due process. The close relationship between the two rationales is suggested in Justice Stewart's concurrence in Roe v. Wade:
mhe Griswold decision can be rationally understood only as a holding that the
Connecticut statute substantively invaded the "liberty" that is protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As so understood, Griswold
stands as one in a long line of cases under the doctrine of substantive due process, and I now accept it as such.
410 U.S. 113, 168 (1973). In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976), the Court
again pointed out that, in the areas of marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing and education, "it has been held that there are
limitations on the States' power to substantively regulate conduct." See Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on "Roe v. Wade," 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973);
Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Role in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1973); Vieira, Roe and Doe: Substantive Due Process and the
Right of Abortion, 25 HASTiNGS L.J. 867 (1974).
In the first third of this century, under the doctrine of substantive due process, the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional state statutes that it characterized as "mere
meddlesome interferences with the rights of individuals." Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 61 (1905). The legislation invalidated under this application of the
fourteenth amendment protection of life, liberty and property was primarily in the
areas of economic and labor regulation. The theory of these decisions was that
certain rights, specifically the freedom of contract and the right of private property,
could not be intruded upon by legislative enactments passed under the state's police
power. See Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40
HARv. L. REv. 943 (1927). The Court seemed simply to substitute its own judgment
about the wisdom of regulating certain subjects for that of the legislature.
Although the use of the theory declined in the late 1930s, see Olsen v. Nebraska
ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Assn., 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934), the doctrine has been revived in several recent decisions. It
has, for example, been used by the Supreme Court to invalidate the confinement of a
mentally retarded person because of his incompetency to stand trial, see Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736-38 (1972), and the custodial confinement of persons not
dangerous to themselves or others, see O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573-76
(1975). Lower courts have relied on substantive due process theory to protect
institutionalized retarded persons from involuntary sterilizations, see Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1383 (M.D. Ala. 1974), and to establish a right to treatment for
civilly committed patients, see, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.
1971), supplemental decisions, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 344 F. Supp. 387
(M.D. Ala. 1972), affd. in part, remanded in part and revd. in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
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State Administrationof ECT to Competent Patients

The Strength of the State Interest in Forcibly Administering
ECT to Nonconsenting Competent Patients

Although state administration of ECT to a nonconsenting competent patient infringes that individual's constitutional rights, the state
may proceed if it can demonstrate a sufficient interest in treating
the patient. The interference by government with certain personal
rights normally requires only a rational relationship between the
state's purpose and the state's act. However, if the right infringed
has been deemed "fundamental," the state's action will not be sustained unless it can demonstrate a compelling or qualitatively greater
interest. Under this approach, therefore, it is initially necessary to
determine whether a patient's right to refuse electroconvulsive therapy
is a "right" or a "fundamental right."
There appear to be no objective standards by which to judge
Nevertheless, freedom
whether a particular right is fundamental."
of speech has been consistently declared fundamental.88 Moreover,
the privacy guarantee extends only to those personal rights that have
already been deemed fundamental.8 9 Since the right to refuse ECT
is derived from these two rights, it is necessarily fundamental.
A recent decision of the Minnesota supreme court effectively
demonstrates this method of constitutional analysis. In Price v.
Sheppard,0 0 the court held that the state's administration of ECT
to a fourteen-year-old patient without his consent and over the
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th
Cir. 1974); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974).
Substantive due process analysis is appropriate if the state's administration of ECT
intrudes upon a property or liberty interest of the patient. It is conceivable that an
individual may be deemed to possess a property right in the integrity of his mind. It
is more likely, however, that a patient might be found to possess a liberty interest in
his mental process. The Court held in Grosjean v. American Press Co. that "[the]
word 'liberty' contained in [the fourteenth] amendment embraces not only the right
of a person to be free from physical restraint, but the right to be free in the
enjoyment of all his faculties as well." 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
87. Justice Powell has stated that "the key to discovering whether education is
'fundamental' . . . lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973). The usefulness of that standard was questioned by
Justice Marshall who asked, "I would like to know where the Constitution guarantees
the right to procreate, or the right to vote in state elections, or the right to an appeal
from a criminal conviction. 411 U.S. 1, 100 (1973) (Marshall, J.,dissenting)
(citations omitted). It would seem that the classification actually derives from a
prior judicial balancing of the importance of the individual's interest against the
countervailing assertions of state authority.
88. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965).
89. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). See Gunther, Foreword: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
90. -

Minn. -,

239 N.W.2d 905 (1976).
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objection of his mother violated the patient's right of privacy. The
court said that, before forcing an unwilling patient to undergo ECT,
the state must "demonstrate a legitimate and important state interest." 91 It further stated:
[The right of privacy] is not an absolute one and must give way to
certain interests of the state, the balance turning on the impact of
the decision on the life of the individual. As the impact increases,
so must the importance of the state's interest. Some decisions, we
assume, will be of little consequence to the individual and a showing
of legitimate state interest will justify its intrusion; other decisions,
on the other hand, will be of such major consequence that only the
most compelling state interest will justify the intrusion.92
The court did not reach the question whether the administration
of ECT to the plaintiff satisfied a sufficient state interest.93 It never-

theless expressed deep concern over the highly intrusive nature of this
therapy. To prevent further intrusive treatments to nonconsenting
patients, the court articulated a procedure that would henceforth
require judicial determination of the necessity and reasonableness of
nonconsensual ECT treatments.94
It is submitted, however, that had the court in Sheppard reached
the question of the strength of the state interest, it would have de-

cided that state administration of ECT to nonconsenting competent
patients fulfills no legitimate or sufficiently strong state interest.
The only Supreme Court case that considers whether medical
91. - Minn. at-, 239 N.W.2d at 911.
92. - Minn. at -, 239 N.W.2d at 910.
93. Citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), the court found for the
defendant, arguing that "given the vagueness of the constitutional right of privacy,
...the defendant could not reasonably have known that the administration of
electroshock treatments to [the plaintiff] violated a 'clearly established' constitutional
right." - Minn. at--, 239 N.W.2d at 912.
94. The court adopted the following procedure:
(1) If the patient is incompetent to give consent or refuses consent or his guardian other than persons responsible for his commitment also refuses his consent,
before more intrusive forms of treatment may be utilized, the medical director
of the state hospital must petition the probate division of the county court in
the county in which the hospital is located for an order authorizing the prescribed treatment;
(2) the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of the
patient;
(3) in an adversary proceeding, pursuant to the petition, the court shall determine the necessity and reasonableness of the prescribed treatment.
Minn. at -, 239 N.W.2d at 913.
In making that determination, the court should balance the patient's need for
treatment against the intrusiveness of the prescribed treatment. Factors which should
be considered are:
(1) the extent and duration of changes in behavior patterns and mental activity
effected by the treatment, (2) the risk of adverse side effects, (3) the experimental nature of the treatment, (4) its acceptance by the medical community of
this state, (5) the extent of intrusion into the patient's body and the pain connected with the treatment, and (6) the patient's ability to competently determine
for himself whether the treatment is desirable.
- Minn. at -, 239 N.W.2d at 913 (footnote omitted).
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treatment may be given to unwilling competent patients is Jacobson
v. Massachusetts.5 In that case, the Court sustained a Massachusetts statute that required citizens to receive smallpox vaccinations. It was held that "the rights of the individual in respect of
his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations,
as the safety of the general public may demand."9' 6 In Jacobson,
the public possessed a valid interest in reducing the risk of smallpox.
No similar state interest is fulfilled by forcing ECT upon competent
patients. The refusal to receive the treatment affects only the
patient; there is no threat of a contagious disease that might
endanger the public health. Thus, the conclusion reached97 in New
York City Health and Hospital Corporationv. Stein is sound:
It does not matter whether this court would agree with her judgment
[to refuse ECT]; it is enough that she is capable of making a deciion, however unfortunate that decision may prove to be. It is her
own well being that is at stake, and, giving effect to the spirit of
[the statute], she must be permitted to consent or withhold her
consent. 98
95. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
96. 197 U.S. at 29.
97. 70 Misc. 2d 944, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
98. 70 Misc. 2d at 947, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 465. See Cantor, A Patient'sDecision To
Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of
Life, 26 RUTGERS L RaV. 228, 263 (1973).
The right to refuse medical treatment has been upheld in decisions that declined to
order lifesaving blood transfusions for Jehovah's Witnesses who refused them. In In
re Estate of Brooks, the Illinois supreme court held that the free exercise of religion
could be restricted by the state only "where such exercise endangers, clearly and
presently, the public health, welfare or morals." 32 Ill. 2d 361, 372, 205 N.E.2d 435,
441 (1965). The court refused to intervene even though it acknowledged that the
patient's decision might be regarded as "unwise, foolish or ridiculous." 32 Ill. 2d at
373, 205 N.E.2d at 442. Also, in In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Ct. App.
1972), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals found no compelling reason to
override the refusal of a transfusion by a religiously motivated patient. The Brooks
and Osborne result was reached in Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d
705 (Sup. Ct. 1962), but on different grounds: the patient's refusal of a transfusion
was respected on the grounds of individual autonomy and not religious belief. The
court stated: "[lit is the individual who is the subject of a medical decision who has
the final say ....
[T]his must necessarily be so in a system of government which
gives the greatest possible protection to the individual in the furtherance of his own
desires." 44 Misc. 2d at 28, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
Nevertheless, in the vast majority of cases in which the patient has refused lifesaving treatment on religious grounds, the courts have overriden the patient's decision.
See, e.g., Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Conn.
1965); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201
A2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v.
Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 582-83, 279 A.2d 670, 673 (1971); see Paris, Compulsory Medical Treatment and Religious Freedom: Whose Law Shall Prevail?, 10 U.S.F.L. REv.
(1975).
For the most part, those cases in which the patient's decision was overridden were
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The Supreme Court has acknowledged in other contexts as well
that the discretion to exercise certain personal rights must rest upon
the individual alone. In Farretta v. California,' for example, the
Court held that a criminal defendant could proceed in propria

persona so long as his waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel
was made knowingly and intelligently. Although the Court agreed
emergency situations where the patient was not competent at the time the treatment
was required to save his life. See, e.g., Application of President & Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d at 1008. Arguably, these cases should be
analogized to ECT and incompetents, see text at notes 131-43 infra, in which context
it is argued that the state may have a sufficient interest in ordering the treatment.
Usually, where the patient is fully competent and is making a voluntary and knowing
decision, and no third party-such as a child-dependent-will unduly suffer, the
patient's wishes are respected. These latter cases support the conclusion that competent patients should be allowed to refuse ECT.
It should be noted, however, that the desire of a patient who, though incompetent
at the time of transfusion, had previously indicated by means of a release card carried
in the wallet, or the testimony of his family, that no blood was ever to be
administered to him, has not always been treated as having expressed his will. See
Paris, supra, at 3. This argument assumes that an individual who has given such a
"prior refusal" would, if competent, revoke it when actually confronting imminent
death. However, the commentators and courts that adopt this view have been subject
to increasing attack. See, e.g., Cantor, supra, at 242-54. Cantor does acknowledge
that the patient's refusal could be overridden if the result were to inflict "legally
cognizable harm" on third persons but finds the traditionally protected harms to
others (grief of family, economic loss to relatives, economic burden on state, stress to
physicians) not sufficient. Id. at 249-54.
Finally, even if one accepts the view that the state can require blood transfusions
in any case, notwithstanding the patient's refusal, it does not necessarily follow that the
state may override a patient's refusal in the ECT context. Unlike the need for blood,
for which there is rarely a less drastic alternative, ECT is rarely required immediately. The American Psychological Association has stated that
most psychiatric emergencies . . . can usually either be anticipated or initially
handled without the use of somatic treatments such as electro-convulsive treatment. For example, homicidal or suicidal patients may be well handled in protected settings for brief periods of time via, if necessary, physical isolation techniques which deny the patient access to any potential weapons.
Position Statement of the Am. Psychiatric Assoc. on Possible Revision of the Standard
9, filed Dec. 20, 1974 in Wyatt v. Hardin, Civ. Action No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala., Feb.
28, 1975).
Thus, the blood transfusion case most analogous to the ECT problem is In re
Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972), where the court respected the religious
beliefs of the parents, and refused to order a transfusion for a minor child in a
situation not involving an imminent threat to life. That analysis is the more
appropriate one for the ECT context. One could, of course, argre that Green is
incorrect. In that case, the surgery that the parents did not allow their child to
receive would have probably allowed him to walk again; postponing the surgery would
risk rendering him permanently bedridden. Arguably, the state has a sufficient
interest in the well-being of its citizens to override such a parental choice. However,
even if Green were so decided, the situation of ECT can be easily distinguished.
Unlike the surgery contemplated in Green-and unlike the medical treatment contemplated in all of the transfusion cases-there is no assurance that ECT will benefit the
patient and there is a substantial risk of complications. Because there is not nearly
the expected benefit from such treatment, the state arguably lacks a substantial
enough interest to compel ECT.
99. 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
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that a defendant would usually receive a better defense with the
guidance of counsel, it nevertheless concluded:
Personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages. The right
to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the
State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the
defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether
in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he
may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his
choice must be honored out of "that respect for the individual which
is the lifeblood of the law."' 100
2.

Consent as Waiver of ConstitutionalRights

Medical treatment administered without the consent of the patient
is likely to constitute a battery.' 0 ' With regard to state administration of ECT, the consent must, in addition to making an otherwise
impermissible touching privileged, amount to a waiver of the
patient's constitutional rights. Without such a waiver, the treatment,
in the absence of a sufficient state interest, is unconstitutional.
The standard for waiver of constitutional rights has received the
greatest attention in the context of the criminal law. In 1938, the
Supreme Court, when sustaining the waiver of counsel in a federal
trial, defined waiver as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right."'1 2 Since then, the Court has 'upheld the
criminal defendant's waiver of rights in a variety of contexts. 0 3
Because of the importance of these rights, the Court has insisted that
certain requirements be met to ensure the validity of the waiver. In
Brady v. United States, the Court declared that "[w]aivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing,
intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." 104
Thus, the three elements of a valid waiver appear to be competence, knowledge and voluntariness. It is apparent that informed
100. 422 U.S. at 834 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
101. Consent is the mechanism by which the patient grants the physician permission to invade his person for the purpose of treatment. W. PROSSER, supra note 54,
at 101. Thus, informed consent distinguishes legally permissible medical interventions from those that would subject a doctor to liability on either a battery or negligence theory. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122-23 (D.C. Cir.
1941); Waltz & S~heuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628
(1969); Note, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396,
1399-400 (1967); Note, Restructuring Informed Consent, 79 YALE L.J. 1533, 1538
n.4 (1970).
102. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
103. See, e.g., Mich. v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (waiver of right against
self-incrimination).
104. 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (footnote omitted).
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consent and waiver involve "essentially comparable standards";'or
accordingly, if a patient's consent to ECT is informed, it constitutes
a valid waiver of the constitutional rights that nonconsensual
treatment would violate.' 0 In most medical procedures, the process
of giving or withholding consent is "private"-that is, the attending
physician, based on his consultation with the patient, determines
whether the patient consents to proposed treatment. The physician's judgment is questioned only if the patient or his representative later sues him, alleging that a necessary element of informed
consent was absent. 10 7 In the context of state administration of
ECT, the unique situation of the institutionalized mental patient
makes it extremely unlikely that truly informed consent will be
given.10 8 Yet the manner in which the existence of informed consent of institutionalized mental patients is currently ascertained poses
the danger that consent will nevertheless be proclaimed by persons
administering ECT. Consequently, further safeguards of patients'
constitutional rights must be developed.
Competence, the first of the three elements of informed consent,
is "the ability of the subject to understand rationally the nature of
the procedure, its risks, and other relevant information."' 100 The
tendency of some individuals-particularly medical professionalsto consider all mental patients legally incompetent reflects a gross
misunderstanding; indeed, it is well settled that a person should not
be deemed incompetent solely because he is hospitalized or is receiving psychiatric treatment."10 This principle has been codified
by several states,"' and courts have specifically recognized that a
person who has been civilly committed is not incapable of making
decisions in all areas of his life. For example, one court held
unconstitutional a Connecticut statute that made the state commissioner of finance conservator of the funds of all residents of
105. Friedman, Legal Regulation of Behavior Modification, 17 ARIz. L. REV. 39,

71 (1975).
106. See Shapiro, supra note 59, at 280-81.
107. For example, a patient who is left unexpectedly paralyzed following surgery
might sue his physician for nondisclosure of a risk of the procedure, alleging that had
he been more fully informed he would not have consented. See Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
108. Difficulties presented by the physician's control over major aspects of a
patient's consent may not be confined solely to the setting of psychiatric treatment. A
strong argument has been made that, in most current medical transactions, physicians
have become "increasingly susceptible to pressures which may conflict with the
interests of [their] immediate patients" so that a profession-wide system of underdisclosure has developed. Schneyer, supra note 7, at 127.
109. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 2 Prison L. Rptr. at 476.
110. See AMERICAN BAR

FOUNDATION,

264 (1971).
111. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. &
LAWS ch. 123, § 25 (1972).

THE MENTALLY

INST. CODE

DISABLED AND

THE LAW

§ 5331 (West Supp. 1976); MASS. ANN.
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mental institutions whose assets totalled less than $5000. The court
considered this procedure violative of the patient's due process rights
because no hearing had been held to determine whether the patient
was capable of managing his own financial affairs." 2
Thus, some patients will be sufficiently competent to form their
own judgment about whether to consent to ECT. Many others,
however, will indeed be incapable of giving informed consent. A
number of psychiatric disorders prevent the patient either from
understanding the nature of any treatment or, because of the
patient's confusion or agitation, from articulating a choice about
whether to receive it. In fact, one court has identified institutionalization itself as a factor that impairs the patient's competence, on
the theory that involuntary institutional confinement strips him of the
sense of his own mental integrity and self worth." 3 Surely such
patients should not be deemed competent to give informed consent
to ECT.
A difficult problem that threatens the efficacy of constitutional
waiver requirements, however, is the inability of the treating physician to make an unbiased determination of the patient's competence. In most kinds of medical treatment, the physician himself
decides whether the patient is competent and thereby capable of
giving consent. When the physician who recommends ECT is an
ardent believer in the utility of that type of therapy, he may be more
inclined to find the patient competent because that result would
allow him to pursue the course of treatment he deems best for the
patient." 4 Since a competent patient can consent to and then
undergo intrusive mental treatments, some sort of review mechanism
is necessary to ensure that the patient whom the physician declares
capable of giving consent is actually competent.
The second element of informed consent is knowledge. For
consent to be effective, it must be given knowingly; "uninformed
consent" is tantamount to no consent at all." 5 However, the extent
to which a physician must disclose the nature and risks of a proposed
treatment has been vigorously debated. Many jurisdictions have
adopted the rule that a doctor has the duty to reveal such information
as would be disclosed by a doctor in good standing within the medi112. McAuliffe v. Carlson, 377 F. Supp. 869 (D. Conn. 1974), supplemental
decision, 386 F. Supp. 1245 (D. Conn. 1975).
113. See Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, 2 Prison L. Rptr. at 433.
But see Murphy, Total Institutions and the Possibility of Consent to Organic
Therapies, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (197f) (institutionalization per se should not bar the
inmate's ability to consent).
114. Cf. J. NEAMAN, SUGGESTIONS OF THE DEVIL:

ORIGINS OF MADNESS 171-72

(1975).
115. See Darrah v. Kite, 32 App. Div. 2d 208, 210-11, 301 N.Y.S.2d 286, 291-92
(Sup. Ct. 1969).
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This standard has been severely questioned"

7

and has been rejected in several states. Most of these states have
embraced the standard that a doctor has a duty to disclose what the
reasonable patient needs to know to make an intelligent decision
about whether to undergo treatment." 8 As the California supreme
court held in Cobbs v. Grant:
[T]he patient's right of self-decision . . . can be effectively exercised
only if the patient possesses adequate information to enable an intelligent choice. The scope of the physician's communication to the
patient, then, must be measured by the patient's need, and that need
is whatever information is material to the decision. Thus the test for
determining whether a potential peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patient's decision." 9

This approach rejects the so-called therapeutic privilege that
allows the physician to withhold information if he believes its disclosure would be medically or psychologically harmful to the patient.
The privilege is based on the assumption that revealing certain risks
to the patient might unnecessarily frighten him and cause needed
treatment to be refused.

2°

Persuasive evidence exists, however,

that a majority of patients want to know what complications should
be expected'' and that the risk of overdisclosure is exaggerated.' 22
116. See Comment, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 1396, 1397 n.5 (1967).
117. See Waltz v. Scheuneman, supra note 101, at 639-40 (1969); Note, 79 YALE
L.J. 1533, supra note 101, at 1559.
118. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Fogal v. Genesee Hosp. 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d
552 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 625, 295 A.2d 676, 688
(1972); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 12-13, 227 N.W.2d
647, 653-54 (1975). See Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251 (Alas. 1975); Hamilton v. Hardy, - Colo. App. -, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976); Demers v. Gerety, 85
N.M. 641, 515 P.2d 645 (1973); Zeleznik v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 47 App.
Div. 2d 199, 366 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1975); Holland v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 270
Ore. 129, 522 P.2d 208 (1974); Small v. Gifford Memorial Hosp., 133 Vt. 552, 349
A.2d 703 (1975); Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash. App. 230, 523 P.2d 211 (1974). But see
Miceikin v. Field, 37 Ill. App. 3d 763, 347 N.E.2d 320 (1976); Bly v. Rhoads, 216
Va. 645, 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976).
119. 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 515 (1972).
120. See Coleman, Terrified Consent, 2 PHYSICIAN'S WORLD 5 (1974). Problems
with this therapeutic justification for withholding information are discussed in Capron, Informed Decision-Making in Genetic Counseling: A Dissent to the "Wrongful
Life" Debate, 48 IND. L.J. 581, 589-91 (1973).
121. Alfidi, Informed Consent: A Study of Patient Reaction, 216 J. AM. MED. A.
1325, 1325-29 (1971).
122. One psychiatrist states that the profession is unduly concerned with alarming
patients by overdisclosure: "We regularly see our neurotic and even psychotic
patients rise to the occasion when confronted with reality stress and exercise
remarkably sound judgment. Neuroses are born of irrational anxieties, not reality

based fears."

Modlin, Informed Consent: Mandate or Myth,

MEDICAL

INSIGHT

REPIuNTr (May 1972). In fact, one study reports that patients with clear ideas about
the nature of the treatment show greater improvement than uninformed patients. See
Park, Covi & Uhlenhuth, Effects of Informed Consent on Research Patients and
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Both the nature of the information disclosed and the method of
disclosure have traditionally been left to the discretion of the treating

physician.

Although strong pressures for underdisclosure exist in

medical practices generally,

23

these pressures are particularly acute

in the context of ECT and other mental treatments. These medical
practitioners assume that their patients need mental treatments and

are therefore particularly reluctant to disclose information that may
cause the patient to refuse it.'

Where the "community standard"

rule for disclosure is in effect, underdisclosure to mental patients is,
unfortunately, a protected practice. Even under the Cobbs rule,
however, it appears that additional safeguards may be necessary to

ensure adequate disclosure.
Of the three elements of informed consent, voluntariness is

perhaps the most problematic from the point of view of protecting
patients' rights.

Many commentators have observed that a certain

amount of coercion is inherent in any doctor-patient relationship.
The superior knowledge, expertise, and authority of the physician

places him in an advantageous position in dealing with his patient.
Moreover, the patient may be psychologically dependent on the
physician and therefore unable to weigh the risks and benefits of
a proposed treatment. 12,

These factors tend to impede the volun-

tariness of the patient's consent.
Study Results, 145 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 349, 349-57 (1967). Fuller
disclosure may also inure to the patient's physical as well as psychological well-being.
Schneyer points out that a patient often possesses information relevant to treatment
decisions of the physician and that the patient may be unaware of the importance of
such information for a treatment decision until the physician has disclosed certain
data. See Schneyer, supra note 7, at 134.
123. Tensions within the doctor-patient relationship may result in significant
underdisclosure of medical risks and alternatives. See Schneyer, supra note 7, at 13641. In addition, increased third-party payment of medical bills has "blunted patients'
pecuniary bias against costly treatment alternatives." Id. at 138-40. That such
tensions may result in a decision-making bias toward underdisclosure has been
explained in part by two aspects of the provision of medical services:
First, the physician traditionally functions both as the manager of the patient's
case who determines or at least recommends what mix of goods and services
would best serve the patient's needs, and as a supplier who stands to benefit from
the provision of only some of these inputs. Second, the inherently uncertain
outcomes of alternative treatments may afford the physician a number of recommendations that can be made in good faith. Therefore, biases, pecuniary or
otherwise, could influence treatment recommendations.
Id. at 136-37. Such biases may affect not only the amount of disclosure but also the
method and timing of disclosure. See Capron, supra note 7, at 379. If disclosure
occurs immediately before the treatment, it may suggest to the patient and to the
hospital staff itself that obtaining consent is something of a formality-that there can
be little expectation of refusal since so much preparation for the surgery has already
occurred. California tries to reduce these effects by requiring 24 hours between the
physician's disclosures and the signing of consent. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE. §
5326.3(d) (West Supp. 1976).
124. See Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization and the Adversary
Process, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 897, 910 (1975).
125. See Capron, supra note 7, at 386.
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No one seriously contends, of course, that the existence of these
factors is sufficient by itself to render consent ineffective in the usual
doctor-patient relationship. The difficulty in the context of ECT
and similar intrusive treatments, however, is that these pressures
are particularly acute. The nature of the coercion may be so intense
that no involuntarily confined patient may truly be able to give
informed consent. As observed by the court in Kaimowitz v.
Department of Mental Health:
The involuntarily detained mental patient is in an inherently coercive atmosphere even though no direct pressures may be placed on
him. He finds himself stripped of the customary amenities and defenses. Free movement is restricted. He becomes a part of communal living subject to the control of the institutional authorities.
• . . Indirect and subtle psychological coercion has a profound effect
upon the patient population. Involuntarily confined patients cannot
reason as equals over whether they should undergo psychosurgery.
They are not able to voluntarily give informed consent because of
6
the inherent inequality in their position.' 2
Further, it is by no means certain that voluntarily hospitalized
patients are immune from the pressures placed on involuntary
patients. Studies have shown that mental patients are sometimes
classified as "voluntary" for merely failing to protest hospitalization. 27 Moreover, the classification may hide various forms of
familial and official coercion. 12 8 Once hospitalized, the patient is
subjected to the same kinds of institutional pressures that face the
involuntary patient. 12 9 Even though a patient is considered to have
been voluntarily committed, this does not assure that his consent to
mental treatments is always voluntarily given.' 30
C.

State Administration of ECT to Incompetent Patients:
The Strength of the State Interest
Although it is true that many patients in mental institutions have
126. 2 Prison L. Rptr. at 477. For a discussion of the inability of institutionalized patients to consent voluntaril, see Burt, Why We Should Keep Prisoners from
Doctors, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 25, 27 (1975).
127. See Gilboy & Schmidt, "Voluntary" Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 66
Nw. U.L. REv. 429 (1971). The "voluntary" label also covers all juvenile patients,
regardless of whether they consented to treatment. See Ellis, Volunteering Children:
Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 840
(1974).
128. See Ellis, supra note 127; Gilboy & Schmidt, supra note 127.
129. A former patient writes that "the central fact of life for an institutionalized
person is a persuasive and abiding sense of total powerlessness." Gotkin, New Words
for an Old Power Trip: A Critique of Behavior Modification in Institutional Settings,
17 ARIZ. L. REv. 29, 30 & n.5 (1975).
130. The court in Aden v. Younger found that the classification of mental
patients, both voluntary and involuntary, was rationally related to the law's objective
of insuring that certain medical procedures not be performed on unwilling patients.
57 Cal. App. 3d at 673, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 542.
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the capacity to make rational decisions for themselves concerning
whether to undergo intrusive treatments, many other patientsperhaps a majority-do not possess that capability. The predicament of these patients poses problems distinct from those that occur
when a competent patient is involved.
As discussed earlier, in order to infringe a fundamental constitutional right, the state must demonstrate a compelling state interest.' 3 ' An early Supreme Court case that directly addressed the
question whether the state could unilaterally administer medical
procedures to incompetent patients was Buck v. Bell."12 The Court
found "[t]he principle that sustains compulsory vaccination [to
be] broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes,"' 3 3 and
therefore upheld a Virginia statute that provided for the sterilization
of incompetents. Protecting the public welfare was considered to
justify sterilization: Society would benefit financially because many
sterilized incompetents could be released from the state hospital,
thereby saving the state the cost of their care. 3 ' Justice Holmes
delivered the Court's opinion:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon
the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not
call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for these
in order
lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned,
13 5
to prevent our being swamped with incompetence.
Yet it is not self-evident that the state possesses what would now
be considered a substantial interest in treating incompetent patients.
The monetary considerations approved in Buck have been undercut
by Shapiro v. Thompson:13 1 In order to demonstrate a compelling
interest, the state must "do more than show denying welfare benefits
to new residents saves money. 1" 7 Since the rights infringed by ECT
are of a fundamental stature, the possible savings engendered by curing patients is not by itself sufficient to justify the intrusion. Similarly,
131. See text at notes 87-100 supra.

132. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
133. 274 U.S. at 207.
134. 274 U.S. at 206.
135. 274 U.S. at 207.
136. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
137. 394 U.S. at 633. However, the North Carolina supreme court recently
rejected an equal protection challenge to the state sterilization statute, finding that the
classification of mentally ill or retarded was reasonably related to the object of
preventing "the procreation of children by a mentally ill or retarded individual who
because of physical, mental, or nervous disease or deficiency that is not likely to
materially improve, would probably be unable to care for a child." In re Joseph Lee
Moore, N.C. Sup. Ct. (January 29, 1976), quoted in 44 U.S.L.W. 2385, 2386
(February 24, 1976). See also Note, Rights of Mentally Ill-Involuntary Sterlization-Analysis of Recent Statutes, 78 W. VA. L. REV. 131, 137-38 (1975).
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the desire to rid society of incompetence has little strength. In
O'Connor v. Donaldson, the Court framed the issue as follows:
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its
citizens from exposure to those whose ways are different? One might
as well ask if the State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all
who are physically unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or animosity cannot138constitutionally justify the deprivation
of a person's physical liberty.
If the state cannot incarcerate to limit the number of incompetents
in society, it follows that the state may neither sterilize nor impose
other treatments upon mental patients for the same purpose.
Thus, the interests articulated in Buck that sustained a forcible
medical intervention upon an. incompetent patient are no longer
thought to have substantial weight and would probably not sustain
administration of ECT upon an incompetent individual. However,
the sterilization procedure approved in Buck can be distinguished
from ECT in an important regard. Sterilization is not a "curative"
treatment, while ECT is intended to improve the mental well-being
of the patient. That the state has a valid interest in providing care
and assistance to protect the health, welfare, and safety of its citizens
under the parens patriae doctrine is well settled. 13 9 This interest
may well be strong enough to justify requiring ECT for certain
patients. In fact, this was the holding of Price v. Sheppard:
The state's interest in assuming the decision [whether a patient receives ECT] is in acting as parens patriae,fulfilling its duty to protect
the well-being of its citizens who are incapable of so acting for themselves. Under the circumstances of this case, that interest can be
articulated as the need for the state to assume the decision-making
role regarding the psychiatric treatment for one who, presumptively,
based on the fact of commitment on the ground of mental illness, is
unable to rationally do so for himself. If that interest of the state
is sufficiently important to deprive an individual of his physical liberty, it would seem to follow that it would be sufficiently important
140
for the state to assume the treatment decision. We hold that it is.
The rationale for this holding is relatively simple: The state acting
as parens patriae may commit an individual who lacks the capacity
to make a rational decision about whether to undergo hospitalization.
Inherent in this determination is the judgment that such an individual
can be forced to accept treatments. Otherwise, the individual
4
could frustrate the state's purpose in hospitalizing him. '
138. 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
139. 422 U.S. at 574.
140. - Minn. at -, 239 N.W.2d at 911 (footnote omitted, emphasis original).
141. See Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
H,av. L. REv. 1190, 1344 (1974).
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The difficulty with this position is that it presumes a mental
patient, who has been incarcerated through the legal process, to be
unable to make virtually any decision for himself. As a general rule,
the state may not incarcerate an individual for custodial purposes
only;1 42 hence, all involuntarily committed patients are presumed to
need some form of treatment. It does not follow, however, that such
patients are in need of highly intrusive treatments. In many cases,
for example, counselling may be wholly sufficient. The fact of
incarceration should not create a presumption that the patient loses
all of his rights. A better approach, the nature of which is explained
below, 4 would recognize that an adjudicatory hearing is required
before ECT may be administered to an incompetent patient. Yet
with the primary conclusion of the court in Sheppard there can be
little dispute: The state has a valid interest in the health of its citizens and may infringe certain rights of the individual in order to
preserve or attain their well-being.
Because incompetent patients lack the capacity to give informed
consent, which is a prerequisite of medical treatment, many states
have passed legislation specifying how substitute consent may be
given. Sometimes "consent" is given by personal representatives
of the patient, such as a relative or guardian, but more often it is
provided by the state, through a doctor in a state institution or some
other mental health authority who prescribes the treatment for the
patient. Yet it should be clear that the state cannot waive or take
away certain rights of its citizens without due process. Hence an
adjudicatory hearing, after which a court may approve treatment, is
the appropriate means of establishing substitute consent. The next
portion of this Note will argue that this procedure, which is not
always followed, is actually required by the Constitution.
D.

PretreatmentReview of the Decision to Administer ECT

In the case of incompetent patients, there is no effective check
on the discretion of medical practitioners, in the absence of legislation,
to decide whether a particular treatment is the least drastic alternative or even whether it is necessary at all. It is also apparent that
the present method of securing a competent patient's consent does
142. The Court expressed its holding in O'Connor v. Donaldson as follows: "In
short, a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual
who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing
and responsible family members or friends." 422 U.S. at 575. Thus, the Court left
open the possibility that a competent person might be confined for custodial purposes
in certain circumstances, such as if he cannot survive by himself and has no one to
lend him assistance. For example, the state may commit an aged individual with no
means of support even though that person is legally competent.
143. See notes 166-67 infra and accompanying text.
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not adequately ensure that the consent is knowingly and voluntarily
given. Medical practitioners, often unable to give an objective
evaluation, usually have complete discretion to decide whether a
patient is competent to refuse treatment; it is all too likely that
competent patients will be treated as incompetents and will receive
intrusive treatments without their consent. Although prohibiting
ECT altogether has some proponents, such an approach ignores the
needs of those patients for whom ECT is the last treatment alternative.144 Instead, giyen the significance of the constitutional rights
involved, the magnitude of the dangers posed by ECT, the existence
of several factors that impair the ability of a competent person to
withhold consent, and the peculiar circumstances of incompetent
patients, ECT should not be administered by the state without the
approval of a review panel. In the absence of legislation, some
courts have promulgated such a safeguard.
1. Review of the Decisions of Competent Patients

In the context of the treatment of competent patients, such an
approach would have several advantages. It would help prevent
patients whose "consent" has been coerced, either directly or indirectly, from receiving treatment. It would relieve the administering
physician of the power to make decisions in those cases where he
has a conflicting interest that urges him to declare incompetency.
By providing a check on unilateral treatment decisions by the physician, a review mechanism might, in a few cases, even diminish the
impact of the numerous coercive forces affecting the patient that
render informed consent an inadequate safeguard of the patient's
rights. 145 Still, the mechanism's principal advantage is that it would
prevent ECT in some situations where the coercive factors are so
strong that consent cannot be freely given.
Because all medical treatment is to some degree a physical and
psychological intrusion upon an individual, and because there are
potential problems with competency, knowledge, and voluntariness
in any doctor-patient relationship, it could be argued that a review
mechanism is necessary before any person can receive any medical
144. It is accepted that for some patients ECT is the most effective form of
treatment. See T. DE'mE & H. JARECKT, supra note 21, at 636.
It is, on the other hand, not sensible to abandon the informed consent requirement
completely. Allowing the doctor to do whatever good medical practices dictate when
the patient is incapable of consenting has been characterized as confusing "medical
procedures for the benefit of the patient's health (which the medical profession is
capable of assessing) with the patient's interest in the integrity of person or
personality (which is a question of liberty and is not susceptible to medical judgment)." Jacob, The Right of a Mental Patient to His Psychosis, 39 MOD. L. REv.
17, 36 (1976).
145. See text at notes 125-26 supra.
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treatment. Even if such an approach were thought desirable, only
a few kinds of treatment-such as ECT or psychosurgery-are so
intrusive that constitutional rights are invaded. 14 Moreover, mental
patients deserve special protection not needed by other patients for
several additional reasons. First, the problem of obtaining informed
consent is greater with institutionalized patients than with noninstitutionalized individuals. It is far more likely that patients incarcerated for mental problems are legally incompetent. Patients are
generally less familiar with the risks of ECT and other mental
treatments than with the risks of treatments for nonmental illnesses
and, as noted earlier, institutionalized persons are more susceptible
to coercion. 147 Second, mental patients are more likely to receive
medical treatment without their consent being solicited than are
physically ill patients. This results in part from the mistaken view
that a patient who is unable to make a rational judgment about
whether to be hospitalized, and who must therefore be involuntarily
committed, is not capable of making treatment decisions for himself.14 8 Finally, the inadequacy of tort remedies makes a pretreatment review mechanism desirable. Although it is certainly not
easy to compensate a patient for a physical injury such as an unauthorized tonsillectomy, it would be even more difficult to compensate
a person for permanent memory loss or serious impairment of his
mind. Where damage remedies are hopelessly inadequate, courts
have fashioned other mechanisms-often procedural-to protect
Yet injunctive remedies are not realistic
constitutional rights.'
safeguards. Mental patients almost invariably lack quick access to
a lawyer when treatment is proposed. 150 Some patients may not
even be competent. Others who desire the treatment will likely not
sue even though their consent was directly or indirectly coerced.
The suggestion that a protective mechanism is constitutionally
required because certain factors prevent an individual from
knowingly and voluntarily waiving his rights is not a novel legal
146. The scope of such constitutional protection would probably depend on the

scope, heretofore undefined, of the privacy right. It is conceivable that any touching
could be protected by such a right, although such an interpretation seems unlikely.
147. See notes 125-26 supra and accompanying text.
148. The Minnesota Supreme Court has fallen into this trap: "The interest can
be articulated as the need for the state to assume the decision-making role regarding
the psychiatric treatment for one who, presumptively, based on the fact of commitment on the ground of mental illness, is unable to rationally do so for himself." Price
v. Sheppard, -

Minn. -,

emphasis original).

-,

239 N.W.2d 905, 911 (1976)

(footnote omitted,

See R.

RUBENSTEIN & H. LASSWELL, THE SHARING OF POWER IN
A PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL (1966).

149. For example, the inadequacy of civil suits to protect against unreasonable
searches led to the exclusionary rule. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52

(1961).
150. See Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective Mental Treatment, 62 CALIF. L.
REV. 936, 954 (1974).
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argument. Particularly in the criminal law setting, courts have often
ordered the creation of special safeguards when constitutional
rights are endangered. In at least two situations-in-custody police
interrogation and the assertion of a guilty plea-the Supreme Court
has found mechanisms that ensure voluntary consent to be constitutionally required.
In Mirandav. Arizona,' the Court concluded that the pressures
surrounding in-custody interrogation can very easily overbear the
will of the suspect. 1 52 Finding such compulsion to be inconsistent
with the suspect's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination,' 5 3 the Court reasoned that adequate protective devices were
necessary to dispel the compulsion,' 5 4 and therefore held that all
statements obtained during in-custody interrogation were inadmissible unless certain procedural safeguards were followed.', 5 These
constitutionally required safeguards included the Miranda warnings,
which provided the suspect with both the knowledge of his rights
and the opportunity to have counsel present. Through this procedure, the Court sought to assure the voluntariness of any waiver
of fifth amendment rights.' 56
A similar situation exists in the context of intrusive mental
treatments. A review committee is necessary both to give the
subject knowledge of the risks involved with ECT and of his right
to refuse it, and to provide a third party who will help dispel the
inherent coerciveness of the institutional environment. Using the
Miranda rationale, no invasion of rights should be allowed and no
consent recognized unless the procedural safeguard of submission to
a review committee is followed.
One difficulty with this analogy is that the suspect in Miranda was
merely given the opportunity to consult with the third party. The
Court did not find the in-custody atmosphere so coercive that the
the suspect could not knowingly waive his rights. Thus, a literal
application of Miranda to intrusive mental treatments would require
only that the physician inform the patient of the risks of ECT, of
his right to refuse consent, and of his right to speak with the review
committee. However, such a procedure is not sufficient to protect
the constitutional rights of a mental patient. A person who
challenges the validity of his consent to in-custody interrogation is
able to do so before he is sentenced to prison and hence before the
151. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
152. 384 U.S. at 469.
153.
154.
155.
156.
(1975);

384 U.S. at 457-58.
384 U.S. at 458.
384 U.S. at 444-45.
For developments subsequent to Miranda, see Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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full weight of the constitutional deprivation is felt. In contrast, a
patient cannot challenge the validity of his consent to ECT until
after he has received the treatment and his constitutional right (not
to have any mental alteration) has been irrevocably infringed. Thus,
the decision to receive ECT arguably deserves even greater scrutiny
than the decision to consent to in-custody interrogation.1 5 T Moreover, whether the person who is waiving his rights is actually competent to do so is more often a problem with mental patients than with
criminal suspects.
A second area where the Court has created safeguards against the
uninformed waiver of rights involves the guilty plea. Since the
assertion of a guilty plea waives the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's
accusers, the plea must be made voluntarily and with full understanding of its significance. 5 " However, as the Supreme Court has
noted, "ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements,
[or] subtle or blatant threats" may prevent the defendant's waiver
Thus, the Court has required that judges
from being effective.' 5
make certain inquiries to determine whether the waiver has, in fact,
been voluntarily made. 10 Moreover, to provide further protection
the Court has decided that certain
against involuntary waivers,
"prophylactic procedures"' 0 ' must be followed before a person's
guilty plea is considered valid: The record must disclose the facts
that caused the trial judge to conclude that the defendant entered
his plea voluntarily and with understanding. 1 2 Thus, the Court has
given an individual who may lack the ability to make a knowing and
intelligent decision. about whether to plead guilty the benefit of
various mechanisms that help prevent the involuntary waiver of
important constitutional rights.' 6
157. Usually the patient who contests consent will do so in a tort'action following
the administration of ECT. Thus, the analogy to Miranda would be complete only if
a criminal defendant could not challenge a police claim of consent except in a tort
action after he had been convicted, sentenced, and served his time.
158. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
159. 395 U.S. at 242-43.
160. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948).
161. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 247 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

162. 395 U.S. at 244.
163. Similarly, the right to counsel at lineups can be seen as a constitutionally
mandated mechanism to "preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected
by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him." United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). See Grano, Kirby, Biggers and Ash: Do Any
Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?,
72 MICH. L. REv. 719, 755-59 (1974). In addition, in Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483 (1969), the Supreme Court prohibited the states from barring inmates from
providing assistance to one another in the preparation of post-conviction relief
petitions unless the state provided a reasonable alternative to assist in the preparation.
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While requiring certain procedures to safeguard constitutional
rights, the Court has not insisted that any specific measures be used.
For example, the Court in Miranda stated that the procedural
safeguards elucidated therein were required unless other fully
effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right
of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it.',,
Thus, it is not suggested here that any particular type of procedure
for evaluating consent to ECT must be adopted; review mechanisms
for other medical treatments vary widely in form. At the very least,
however, some effective' review mechanism appears to be constitutionally required.
2.

Review of the Decision to Administer ECT to an
Incompetent Patient

In the context of the treatment of incompetent patients, a review
mechanism possesses compelling advantages. It was previously
noted that the holding in Price v. Sheppard-that an individual who
is committed is not capable of making a decision about whether to
undergo treatment-could cause patients who do possess such a
capacity to undergo intrusive treatments against their will. 1 0 A
separate adjudicatory hearing on the question of treatment would
prevent this result.
For purposes of economy, this decision could be made during the
commitment hearing, but the decision to impose intrusive treatments
must be considered apart from the commitment decision itself. Such
an approach would effectively protect the constitutional rights of the
patient: The hearing that decides whether the state may commit
considers the individual's liberty interests, and the hearing that
decides whether to impose intrusive treatment considers the individual's free expression and privacy rights. It might be argued that
the tenuousness of the distinction between intrusive and nonintrusive
treatment will hinder this approach by making it difficult to know
whether the second hearing is required. This is not, however, a
problem for the regulation of ECT. Its certain risks of harm and
its profound impact on the mental process render it highly intrusive;
thus, the state should be required to show a compelling interest
before administering ECT to an incompetent.
In addition to determining whether the patient is incapable of
deciding whether to undergo such treatment, the second hearing
164. 384 U.S. at 467.
165. "Effective" review might preclude determinations by the treating physician
himself or by a colleague. "Effective" might require that determinations and supporting data be recorded.
166. See note 148 supra.
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ensures that the treatment is actually necessary and that all less
intrusive alternatives have been considered. The court would not
evaluate the therapeutic value of the treatment itself; rather, the
court would balance the seriousness of the patient's condition against
the treatment's intrusiveness, thereby ensuring that ECT is the
least drastic alternative.
Although the holding of the Minnesota Supreme Court in Price
v. Sheppard is subject to criticism, the practical effect of the decision
is wholly consistent with the analysis above. At the conclusion of
the opinion, in response to its concern over the broad discretion of
treating physicians in ordering therapy for nonconsenting patients,
the court outlined a procedure that would, in fact, determine
whether the patient was competent and whether the treatment was
necessary. The court specified that, in the future, the medical
director of the state hospital must petition the probate division of
the county court for an order authorizing treatment. The court
would then appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the patient, and,
in an adversary proceeding, the court would determine the necessity
and reasonableness of the prescribed treatment." 7 Such an approach
is desirable to determine whether the state has a sufficient interest
to justify imposing ECT, a very drastic treatment, upon the patient.
3.

Summary

Pretreatment review of the decision of the state to administer
ECT to a patient would most likely be sought in the same manner
in which most mental health rights have been secured. A patientplaintiff or his representative, perhaps representing a class, would
sue a particular governmental entity, such as a state department of
health, for violation of his constitutional rights. In addition to
granting the plaintiff individual relief, the court could order the state,
as it did in Sheppard, to obtain consent prior to the administration
of ECT and to establish a review mechanism to ensure the validity
of the consent of a competent patient or the necessity of giving the
treatment to an incompetent patient.
The effectiveness of this approach is, of course, not without limitations. Mental patients are generally not litigious; their awareness
of their legal rights is often minimal and their access to legal services
is often negligible. 1 68 Moreover, the class of mental patients protected when the court's order is based on constitutional grounds is
restricted by the state action requirement; voluntary patients in
private hospitals would be excluded. 1 9 Finally, any judicially
167. - Minn. at -, 239 N.W.2d at 913.
168. See Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings:
Emerging Problems, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 816, 821-23 (1974).
169. See note 55 supra.
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ordered protections may well be minimal in scope. Such safeguards
in the field of mental health are often difficult to implement and enforce. 170 Court supervision is time-consuming and burdensome, and
the sanction of contempt may be inadequate to ensure compliance."'

While litigation will probably result in the establishment of certain
basic safeguards, a broader strategy may be needed for more
comprehensive protection of patient rights. Legislative regulation
of ECT is advantageous since statutory requirements and standards
are not restricted by the state action limitation. Also, legislation can
be more comprehensive in scope than case-by-case adjudication. It
is to this type of regulation of ECT that this Note now turns.
III.

LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF

ECT

It is well recognized that the power of a state to protect the health
and safety of its citizens is vested in the legislature.' 7 2 This "police
power" has been described as extending "to the protection of the
lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.' 7 3 In
accordance with this power, states have licensed physicians,17 4 have
regulated the administration of drugs by medical practitioners,'" 5 and
have regulated conditions in which medical and psychiatric treatments are provided. 17 0 Legislatures in several states have also
enacted statutes that monitor the administration of ECT.177 It is
appropriate now to explore the constitutionality and desirability of

these statutes.
170. See The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975).
171. See Wyatt v. Hardin, No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala., Feb. 28, 1975) (contempt
proceedings unsuccessfully brought against three physicians and the hospital director).
172. For a discussion of the exercise of police power in areas where the state
seeks to protect the citizen from himself, see Cantor, supra note 98, at 246-49 (1973),
and Note, Motorcycle Helmets and the Constitutionality of Self-Protective Legislation, 30 OHIo ST. L.J. 355 (1969).
173. Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R., 27 Vt. 140, 149 (1854).
174. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2100-2149 (West Supp. 1976).
175. Blinder v. State Dept. of Justice, 25 Cal. App. 3d 174, 181-82, 101 Cal. Rptr.
635, 640 (1972). In United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975), the Supreme
Court held that a physician registered under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 801-904 (1970), as amended by 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (Supp. V 1975), could be
prosecuted under the Act if his activities fell outside the usual course of professional
practice. The Court found that the doctor had acted as a large-scale pusher by
dispensing methadone without adequate examination of the patient and by graduating
his fees according to the number of pills prescribed rather than medical services
provided.
176. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE §§ 1203-1554 (West Supp. 1976).
177. See note 4 supra.
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A.

The Nature of Legislative Regulations

Several states have enacted statutes that control the administration
of intrusive mental treatments. Not surprisingly, the statutes are
varied in format and purpose. Some have recognized an absolute
right to refuse ECT; unless the informed consent of the patient, his
guardian, or a next-of-kin is obtained, these statutes-though several
suffer from drafting problems-appear to forbid intrusive treatments. 7 " Others require the written consent of the patient or his
guardian but also provide a procedure for the state179to provide treatment without such consent in certain circumstances.
The most comprehensive statute regulating administration of ECT
and other intrusive mental treatments was recently adopted in California. Assembly Bill 1032, which was signed into law on September 20, 1976, recognizes the mental patient's right to refuse
convulsive treatment including ECT.8 ° Two principal provisions
regulate the treatment. The first establishes several prerequisites
to the administration of ECT to an involuntary patient: (a) the
treating physician must document reasons for the treatment and
certify that it is the least drastic alternative; (b) a review committee composed of two other physicians must agree with the opinion
of the treating physician; (c) a full disclosure of the reasons for, and
the nature and risks of, the treatment must be made to a relative
or a guardian of the patient, unless the patient decides to dispense
with this requirement; (d) the patient must give written informed
consent, which must be reviewed every thirty days and can be revoked
at any time; (e) the patient's attorney--or a court-appointed onemust agree to the patient's capacity or incapacity to give written
informed consent; (f) if the treating physician or the attorney
believes the patient lacks the capacity to give consent, then an evi178. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5161(2)(d) (Supp. 1975) (written informed
consent by the patient or his guardian is required for surgery, ECT, etc.). Accord,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-17-18.5 (1969).
See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.459(3)(b)
(1975) (though unclear whether statute requiring written permission applies to
surgery and ECT, or surgery requiring an anesthetic or ECT); IowA CODE ANN.
Senate File 499, § 23(2) (West's Leg. Serv. 1975 No. 2, at 182, 192) (right to refuse
treatment by shock therapy or chemotherapy, although statute does not say that
consent is necessary).
179. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 17-206(d)

(1975)

(No ECT may be

administered without the written informed consent of patient. If he is incompetent,
no ECT may be given without the informed consent of a guardian, a next-of-kin, or a
physician appointed by the judge of the probate court.); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §
330.1716 (1975) (ECT may not be administered without (1) the consent of the patient if competent, or (2) the consent of a guardian of the incompetent. If neither
kind of consent is possible, then a probate court may consent to the procedure in lieu
of the person eligible to give it.). Cf. KY. REv. STAT. 202A.180(7) (Supp. 1976)
(empowering the Secretary of Human Resources to promulgate regulations to protect
patient rights).
180. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5325f (1976)

(WELF.

& INST. CODE).
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dentiary hearing is held in court to determine the patient's capacity;
(g) if the court determines that the patient does not have capacity,
then ECT may be administered after a relative, guardian, or conservator gives informed consent; and (h) at any time, the patient can
claim regained competency, thereby requiring (e), (f), and (g) to
be repeated. 181
The second principal provision regulates all other administrations
of ECT, including those to voluntary patients in a state institution
or to anyone receiving treatment in a physician's office, clinic, or
private home: (a) requirements (a), (c), and (d) for involuntary
patients must be met; (b) instead of a review committee, one other
physician must certify the patient's capacity to give informed
consent; and (c) if the other physician will not verify the patient's capacity, or if the patient lacks capacity, requirements
(b) (e), (f),
182
(g), and (h) for involuntary patients must be satisfied.
The statute also provides that any patient, whether voluntarily or
involuntarily committed, who is capable of giving informed consent
and refuses to do so may not receive convulsive treatment. 183 Individuals over sixteen years of age are subject to the general provisions
of the act. 184 Treatment is prohibited on children under twelve years
of age and is allowed in only limited circumstances on children between twelve and sixteen years of age.
The California statute, in effect, accepts the constitutional analysis
presented earlier. 185 It recognizes that a patient may be incapable
of making a rational decision about hospitalization yet fully capable
of deciding whether to submit to intrusive treatments. A review
mechanism is provided to ensure proper characterization of the
patient's competence to make the treatment decision. The patient
is given a representative to protect his rights in the adversary
hearing. If the patient is deemed incapable of giving consent,
safeguards are provided to ensure that the treatment is not given
unnecessarily and that it is the least drastic alternative. 186 The Cali181. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.7 (1976) (WELF. & INST. CODE).
182. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.75 (1976)

(WELF. & INST. CODE).

183. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.85 (1976)

(WELF. & INST. CODE).

184. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.8 (1976)

(WELF. & INST. CODE).

185. Recognizing the danger of a violation of a mental patient's constitutional
right to privacy, the Legislature intends by this enactment to assure that the integrity and free choice of every such patient is fully recognized and protected.
Because those who are emotionally disturbed are vulnerable to being unduly influenced, the Legislature believes the protection of their rights requires a careful
process of informing and consenting in order to assure the protection and vindication of their rights.
Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 1 (1976)

(WELF. & INST. CODE).

186. It is not likely that a state could require all other forms of treatment to be
exhausted before allowing administration of ECT. The potential benefit of an ECT
treatment given immediately may outweigh the benefits of proceeding with a six-
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fornia statute could very well become the model for legislation in
other states.
B.

ConstitutionalLimitations

The traditional test for evaluating the constitutionality of a statute
enacted pursuant to the police power has been to determine whether
there is a reasonable relationship between the purpose of the legis-

lation and the means used to accomplish it. If, as noted above, a
state interferes with a fundamental right of an individual, mere

rationality is no longer sufficient;
state interest test is employed.

87

in such cases, the compelling

Once it is shown that a state's inter-

ference with a fundamental right fulfills a sufficient state interest,
however, the judicial inquiry is not concluded.

At that point, the

state must show that its enactments are "narrowly drawn."'' s In
other words, to ensure that the interference with a fundamental right
is minimized, the state is required to choose the "least drastic means"

to accomplish its purpose.'8 9
A variety of state statutes that single out certain medical areas for

regulation have been found constitutional. For example, controlled
drug classifications have been upheld as being designed to promote

a permissible state purpose: "The legislative purpose [to prevent
drug abuse] in making the differentiation [among various drugs]

being thus permissible, indeed laudable, the courts will not assume
the task, for which they are conspicuously unfitted, of inquiring
whether every drug was properly placed by the Legislature in one

schedule rather than another."' 90 The Supreme Court echoed this
month drug treatment or a two-year consultation program, at the conclusion of which
ECT may still be needed. A California court of appeal, however, upheld an
exhaustion-of-all-other-appropriate modalities requirement from an attack of vagueness by construing appropriate modalities to mean "any forms of treatment medically
appropriate for a particularpatient with a particularcondition." Aden v. Younger,
47 Cal. App. 3d 662, 677, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 544-45 (1976) (emphasis original).
Thus the court concluded that "[eivery possible form of therapy need not actually be
used on a patient, because not all forms will be considered appropriate for that
patient. This is a purely medical determination, which is within a doctor's professional judgment." 57 Cal. App. 3d at 677, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 545. Nevertheless, the
new California bill requires only that "all reasonable treatment modalities have been
carefully considered." Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.7(a) (1976), (WELF. &
INST. CODE).

187. See text at note 87 supra.
188. Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
189. This was recognized in Price v. Sheppard: "But once justified, the extent of
the state's intrusion is not unlimited. It must also appear that the means utilized to
serve the state's interest are necessary and reasonable, or, in other words, in light of
alternative means, the least intrusive." - Minn. at -, 239 N.W.2d at 910 (footnote
omitted).
190. Roe v. Ingraham, 480 F.2d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1973), on remand, 403 F.
Supp. 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), application for stay denied sub nom. Whalen v. New
York, 423 U.S. 1313 (1975), probable jurisdiction noted, 96 S. Ct. 1100 (1976).
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language in upholding a state requirement that informed consent be
given prior to an abortion:
We could not say that a requirement imposed by the State that a prior
written consent for any surgery would be unconstitutional. As a consequence, we see no constitutional defect in requiring it only for some
types of surgery as, for example, an intracardiae procedure, or where
the surgical risk is elevated above a specified mortality level, or, for
that matter, for abortions. 191
It is therefore not surprising that state regulation of ECT has
recently been upheld. In Aden v. Younger, a new, important case
in this area, a California court of appeal held that regulation of
is a
intrusive and possibly hazardous forms of medical treatment
1 92
proper and legitimate exercise of the state's police power.
Legislation regulating ECT is not likely to be challenged successfully on the ground that the treatment is not a proper subject of state
regulation. However, many of the specific functions of the review
mechanisms established by state statutes may encounter greater
difficulty. These constitutional issues require more detailed consideration.
1. Certificationof Consent of Competent Patients
One of the most important functions of a pretreatment review
mechanism is to determine whether a patient who consents to ECT
is competent to make such a decision and whether his consent was
knowingly and voluntarily given. However, the authority of the state
to regulate ECT through procedures that review patient consent is
not unlimited, for such regulation may actually interfere impermissibly
with the patient's right to privacy. As discussed earlier, the right
of privacy protects the individual by preventing compulsory administration of ECT on nonconsenting patients. However, the right of
privacy may also protect the right of the individual to receive treatment without undue governmental interference. In this instance, the
right of privacy may be asserted to preserve the sanctity of the doctorpatient relationship. Indeed, as suggested by the recent Supreme
Court abortion decisions, a statute that either prohibits a medical
procedure or conditions its execution upon the consent of a review
committee may impermissibly interfere with the right of privacy encompassed in the doctor-patient relationship.
191. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 96 Sup. Ct. 2831, 2840 (1976) (footnote
omitted).
192. 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 673, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 542. Yet a statute that regulates "ECT," "shock treatment," or "intrusive treatments" might be challenged as being
so vague that the statute cannot be constitutionally enforced. However, ECT and
shock treatment have precise technical meanings and can easily be defined in precise
statutory language. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 676, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
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The Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade9 3 and Doe v. Bolton' 94

that the right of privacy protected a woman's decision to consent to
an abortion. In Roe, the Court held that a woman's decision
whether to have an abortion was protected by the right of privacy
and that no compelling state interest justified overriding her right
during the first trimester. In Doe, the Court held a Georgia statute
that prohibited a physician from performing an abortion without the
concurrence of two other physicians and a hospital committee to be
unconstitutional. 195
Although both cases recognized that a woman has a privacy interest in the doctor-patient relationship, the Court declined to remove
all aspects of that relationship from the scope of permissible legislative regulation. The decisions prohibited state regulation of
abortions during the first trimester because no compelling state
interest was served by such regulation. Criminal abortion laws were
originally intended in part to protect women from the hazards of
artificial termination of pregnancies. The Court noted in Roe that
"[m]odern medical techniques have altered this situation ....
Consequently, any interest of the State in protecting the woman from
an inherently hazardous procedure . . . has largely disappeared."' 90

After the first trimester, however, the Court found two compelling
state interests that justified state regulation of abortions: "preserving
and protecting the health of the pregnant woman'1 97 and "protecting
the potentiality of human life."' 8
If the Court's method of analysis in the abortion cases is applied
to ECT, it appears that state regulation would be allowed. ECT can
be easily distinguished from abortion in the first trimester, which the
state is not allowed to control. First, such abortions are relatively
safe; on the other hand, ECT, due to the possibility of rather severe
complications, may threaten the health and safety of the patient and,
accordingly, is an appropriate subject of state regulation. Second,
while the abortion of a pregnancy is irreversible, it does not affect
the woman's ability to become pregnant again. By contrast, ECT
193. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

194. 410 U.S. 179 (1972).
195. The Court stated:
Review by a committee once removed from diagnosis is basically redundant. We
are not cited to any other surgical procedure made subject to committee approval
as a matter of state criminal law. The woman's right to receive medical care
in accordance with her licensed physician's best judgment and the physician's
right to administer it are substantially limited by this statutorily imposed overview. . . . We conclude that the imposition of the hospital abortion committee
is unduly restrictive of the patient's rights and needs that, at this point, have
already been medically delineated and substantiated by her personal physician.
410 U.S. at 197-98.
196. 410 U.S. at 149.
197. 410 U.S. at 162.
198. 410 U.S. at 162.
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is known to have lasting effects on the mental processes of some
patients. Consequently, the state has a greater interest in ensuring
the patient's consent. Third, unlike ECT patients, women who
obtain abortions are usually fully able to give informed consent. The
competence, voluntariness, or knowledge 'of women seeking
abortions are not likely to be contested.' 9 9 Finally, the function of
the review committee that was struck down in Doe is distinguishable
from the role of a pretreatment review mechanism that certifies
consent. In Doe, the physician review committee was designed to
override the decisions of women, who were almost invariably capable of giving informed consent, to have abortions. A pretreatment
review mechanism for ECT seems less intrusive since it simply
certifies that individuals, whose ability to give informed consent may
be impaired, have knowingly and voluntarily given consent.
It is unreasonable to read the abortion decisions as creating an
absolute privacy right in the doctor-patient relationship. As
declared in Roe, "a state may properly assert important interests in
safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life . .

.

. The privacy right involved, therefore,

cannot be said to be absolute. ' 20 0 Thus, if the state can demonstrate
that the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens is sufficiently
threatened, as is most certainly the case with the administration of
ECT, the state may establish a review mechanism to ensure that the
patient has manifested an effective consent.
2.

DisclosureRequirements

To guarantee that the consent of a patient is informed, state
statutes and regulations sometimes specify what information must be
included in the physician's disclosure to the patient. 20 ' Although
mandatory disclosure requirements have been challenged as impermissible intrusions into the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship,
courts have upheld them as a reasonable method of ensuring the
adequacy of consent.
In Planned Parenthood Association v. Fitzpatrick,20 2 a federal
199. In fact, the Court in Roe presumed the knowledge component of informed
consent when it enumerated broad areas as "factors the woman and her responsible
physician necessarily will consider in consultation." 410 U.S. at 153.
200. 410 U.S. at 153-54.
201. For example, California requires that the proposed patient be clearly and
explicitly told: (1) the reason for treatment; (2) the nature of the procedures to be
used; (3) the probable degree of improvement; (4) the nature and probability of
commonly known side effects; (5) the fact that professional opinion is divided over
the treatment's efficacy; (6) the existence of reasonable alternative treatments; and
(7) the fact that the patient has both the right to refuse and later to revoke consent.
Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.2(a)-(g) (1976) (WELF. & INST. CODE).
202. 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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district court upheld a state requirement that a doctor make certain
disclosures to a woman before performing an abortion. The state's
regulation was deemed not to interfere improperly with the doctorpatient relationship. 203 The court found a sufficient state interest in
the disclosure requirements in part because
the [abortion] procedures, perhaps routine for those performing
them, will probably be totally unlike any others -theretofore undergone by the patient. In addition. . the woman may well be experiencing considerable emotional anxiety ....
The state under such circumstances might understandably wish to
be certain that each woman be given the facts regarding her condition, her options, the abortion procedure to be performed, and the
possible future consequences of the choice she makes. Like the
licensing of facilities, the regulations, and the record-keeping provisions, the informed consent requirement may well be an attempt by
the state to monitor 20the
quality of medical care received by women
4
procuring abortions.

The reasoning in Fitzpatrick is equally persuasive when applied
to pre-ECT disclosure requirements. Mental patients for whom
ECT is proposed are more likely to be unaware of the treatment's
procedures or effects than are women who seek abortions. Thus,
the California court of appeal has held that the California statute,
which required certain information about ECT to be disclosed to the
patient, constituted only a minimal invasion of privacy. The court
said that the statute's purpose-ensuring that consent is given in a
knowing and intelligent manner-"could not be accomplished by
any means short of such disclosure, and the procedure is constitutional. 2 o5
Some statutes, in addition to requiring that particular information
be disclosed to the patient by the physician, 2 6 also require that the

same disclosure be made to certain relatives of the patient before
ECT can be administered. 0 If the patient has been found to lack
the capacity to give informed consent and the relative has 'been
accorded the authority to give consent for the patient, disclosure to
the relative is justified. Otherwise, the relative could not give
203. 401 F. Supp. at 587 (Adams, J.,concurring in part & dissenting in part).
204. 401 F. Supp. at 587 (Adams, J.,concurring in part & dissenting in part).
205. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 682, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 548 (1976).
In response to the challenge that some patients may prefer not to know and thus have
the right to choose not to receive the required disclosure, the court stated that
a patient's request to be left uninformed may provide a doctor a defense to a
tort action, but it does not obligate or constitutionally coerce the doctor into acceding to the patient's wishes. The Legislature has determined ECT and psychosurgery are such intrusive and hazardous procedures that informed consent is a
mandatory prerequisite to treatment.
57 Cal. App. 3d at 675, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 543 (emphasis original).
206. See text at note 201 supra.
207. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.3 (West Supp. 1976).
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informed consent. Similarly, if the legislature allows a relative to
challenge the decision of a court or medical panel to administer ECT
to the patient, then disclosure would be appropriate, It would be
incongruous to conclude that a state may authorize such an appeal
but may not authorize the necessary disclosure to render it
effective.210

However, if the patient is competent, it appears that his privacy
would be unjustifiably infringed by mandatory disclosure to a relative. It might be argued that disclosure to the relatives of a competent patient fulfills a significant state interest: The state might assert
an interest in encouraging informal counseling among family members when intrusive treatments are being contemplated. 200 Such a
conclusion, however, does not necessitate requiring disclosure. If
-the state desires to promote consultation among family members prior
to ECT treatment, it should encourage rather than require the patient
208. A more difficult question arises when the patient is incompetent and the
relative, usually a parent, has been excluded from the substitute decision-making
process. It is arguable that because the relative has no role in the treatment decision,
any disclosure would be unjustified invasion of the patient's privacy. One court has
accepted this view:
The disclosure of the nature and seriousness of the patient's disorder is a clear
infringement of the patient's right of privacy and no countervailing state interest
is apparent. Because no standing to assert the patient's rights is granted to the
relative, it is doubtful this disclosure furthers the protection of patients' rights
or prevents unnecessary treatment.
Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d at 681, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 547.
Although the court may be correct, it seems unwise that any statute should prevent
substitute consent or involvement of relatives in the first instance. To exclude the
parent or child of the incompetent, not only from participating in the patient's
treatment decision but also from discussion of the question and even from all
information about the treatment, may be insensitive to their interests and may not be
legally compelled. Since family members may help care for the patient following
hospitalization and treatment, they can more ably understand the patient's needs if
they have knowledge about his treatment. Also families that are ignorant about the
procedure might withdraw the patient from the institution if they fear the proposed
treatment. Therefore, the state could justifiably authorize disclosure to certain
relatives as part of advancing the patient's best interests. The revised California
legislation follows this approach. A responsible relative of an involuntary patient's
choosing is to be given an oral explanation by the attending physician unless the
patient desires that the relative not be informed or unless the relative is unavailable.
Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.7(c) (1976) (WELF. & INST. CoDE). This
provision is particularly admirable because the relative to be informed is chosen by
the patient himself; the intended benefit of the disclosure, consultation with the
patient, is thereby made more likely. The provision also defers to patient privacy by
allowing the patient to dispense with the requirement.
209. The efficacy of consultation was recognized in Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787
(5th Cir. 1975), which was decided before Danforth. The Poe court examined a
statute that required parental consent before a competent minor could obtain an
abortion. It found that the purpose of parental approval was to help the minor make
a reasonable decision. The court nevertheless held the statute unconstitutional: "At
the very least, the statute 'would more narrowly achieve the state's result if it called
for parental 'consultation' rather than permission prior to abortion." 517 F.2d at 793.
Because Danforth does not address the question of counseling, its impact on the
validity of such a mechanism is uncertain.
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to disclose the information himself. 210 A patient who is sufficiently
competent to decide whether to submit to ECT is capable of deciding
whether consulting his relatives would be beneficial. Compulsory
disclosure of personal information infringes the patient's privacy; it
also threatens individual autonomy by subjecting the patient to family
pressures he may wish to avoid. Compulsory disclosure does not
serve a compelling state interest when the patient is competent;
encouraging disclosure should be preferred, since no individual rights
are infringed.
3. Overriding the Decision of a Competent Patient
Any statute that makes it too difficult for a competent patient to
receive treatment may be overbroad. For example, assume an individual seeks medical assistance for depression and the physician
prescribes ECT. The physician indicates that the patient, after
being fully informed of the nature and risks of the treatment,
knowingly and voluntarily consented. It is proper for the state at
that point to intervene and review the patient's consent. If the
review committee finds either that the patient was competent but
did not give consent, or that the patient was incompetent, treatment
can and should be prevented. 21 ' However, if the committee finds
that the patient was competent and did give consent, the question
remains whether the treatment can be denied, or, in other words,
whether the state can override the consent of a competent patient.
Some states have statutes that require, in addition to the patient's
consent, the approval of another person or a committee before any
210. This is what the California statute does. See Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, §
5326.7(c) (1976) (WELF. & INST. CODE). Problems may arise when information is
disclosed to public officials about the receipt and conditions of treatment. The state
has a strong interest in assuring that its laws concerning ECT are not violated. To
uncover violations, inspection of individual patient records may be necessary. In
Aden v. Younger, the court held that the establishment of a reporting system seeking
to control possible abuses of patients' rights would be a clear invasion of the patients'
privacy if their identities were disclosed; thus, a patient's report could only be
disclosed through a code that would refer to the patient's treatment records. 57 Cal.
App. 3d at 681, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 547-48. See Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), applicationfor stay denied sub nom. Whalen v. New York, 423 U.S.
1313 (1975), probable jurisdiction noted, 96 S. Ct. 1100 (1976). Comment, The
Right to Privacy: New York Statute Interfering with Constitutionally Protected
Doctor-PatientRelationship Invalidated-Roe v. Ingraham, 50 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1149
(1975).
211. As discussed above, see note 180 supra, and as recognized by the California
court of appeal, "'[v]oluntary' patients . . . are susceptible to many of the pressures
placed on involuntary patients." 57 Cal. App. 3d at 674, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 542-43. If
the pressures on all institutionalized patients are acknowledged as being equal, then it
would seem that involuntary and voluntary patients possess undifferentiated interests
in having their competently rendered decisions respected. The revised California
legislation recognizes that the refusal of a competent patient, whether voluntary or
involuntary, must be respected. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.85 (1976)
(WELF. &

INST. CODE).
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treatment can be given. With respect to competent patients, these
mandatory "second consent" provisions have been declared unconstitutional for both abortion and ECT. In Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, the Supreme Court invalidated a Missouri statute that
required the consent of a woman's husband, or, if she were
unmarried and under 18, her parent, for an abortion within the first
twelve weeks of pregnancy.21 2 The right of a competent patient to
make his own decision about whether to undergo ECT was recently
upheld in Aden v. Younger.2" 3 The California law in question did
not permit ECT unless a three-physician committee unanimously
agreed that ECT was "critically needed for the welfare of the
patient."2 4 The court held:
[O]nce the competency of a voluntary patient has been confirmed,
and the truly voluntary nature of his consent is determined, the state
has little excuse to invoke the substitute decision-making process.
. . . [T]here is no justification for infringing upon the patient's
right to privacy in selecting and consenting to the treatment.21 5
The court did not state that a committee could not prevent or even
prescribe ECT for an incompetent, or that a committee could force
a competent patient to receive it. It simply held that the committee
could not prevent a competent patient who desires ECT from receiving such treatment when at least one physician is willing to administer it.
The state may nevertheless be able to justify "second consent"
provisions on another rationale. Because a large proportion of
health services are provided by state funds, the state has a valid interest
in ensuring that health resources are not wasted. More importantly,
the state has a valid interest in the health, safety, and welfare of its
citizens; to the extent that citizens undergo inherently risky medical
treatments that are unnecessary, this interest is impaired. 210 The
issue, then, is whether the interest is sufficiently compelling to override a competent patient's decision to receive ECT.
212. 96 Sup. Ct. 2831 (1976). Developing its holding in Roe v. Wade, the Court
concluded: "PW]e cannot hold that the State has the constitutional authority to give
the spouse unilaterally the ability to prohibit the wife from terminating her pregnancy, when the State itself lacks that right." 96 Sup. Ct. at 2841 (citation omitted).
And in striking down required parental approval the Court explained:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when
one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights ....
Any independent interest the parent may have in the termination of the
minor daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the
competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant.
96 Sup. Ct. at 2843-44 (citations omitted).
213. 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1976).
214. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 677, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
215. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 684, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 549.
216. See S.R. No. 92-1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 254 (1972).
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This question was posed in a different context in Planned Parent-

hood Association v. Fitzpatrick,2 17 which involved a challenge to the

constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute that required a determination of pregnancy prior to the performance of an abortion.21 8 The
requirement precluded the use of one technique of abortion,
menstrual extraction, which is most effective when performed prior to
the time that many widely used tests can detect a pregnancy.
Even though menstrual extraction is performed during the first trimester of pregnancy, which Roe v. Wade immunized from state

regulation, the constitutionality of the provision was upheld:
"[We do not believe that Roe precludes the state from requiring

a positive determination of pregnancy prior to the performance of
an abortion procedure in furtherance of its interest in protecting

nonpregnant females from undergoing unneeded abortion procedures." 2 19

If this reasoning were applied to ECT, "second con-

sent" statutes would seemingly be constitutional, so long as overriding the patient's consent was intended to help the patient.

Given

the high risks of ECT, the state may well be able to assert this
interest and prevail.

Although a state may prohibit unnecessary administrations of
ECT, the standard that draws the demarcation between necessary
and unnecessary treatment must be carefully articulated. For
example, the former California standard-that ECT be "critically
needed for the welfare of the patient" was declared void for vague-

ness."22 0

The recently adopted California statute attempts to im-

prove this language. Under the new act, treatment may not be given

unless it "is definitely indicated and is the least drastic alternative for
this patient at this time."' 221

If even greater specificity is desired, a

217. 401 F. Supp. 554 (F-D. Pa. 1974).
218. In Fitzpatrick, patients in Philadelphia County could obtain an effective test
to determine pregnancy at an early stage, but this procedure was not available outside
the county. 401 F. Supp. at 573-74.
219. 401 F. Supp. at 574. A related case is Association of American Physician
& Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill.), a!f'd. without opinion, 423
U.S. 975 (1975), where the court rejected a challenge to the professional standards
review organizations. These committees were established by Congress to ensure that
payment for medical services under Medicare and Medicaid would be made only when
those services were medically necessary and could not be provided as effectively on a
less expensive out-patient basis. The court upheld the power of the committees
because of the legitimate interest of government in controlling the rapidly rising costs
of its health care delivery systems. The organizations, however, did not actually
function as a "second consent" mechanism. A patient could still get treatment; the
government would simply not pay for it.
220. Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 677, 129 Cal. Rptr. 535, 545 (1976).
221. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.7(a) (1976) (WELF. & INST. CODE).
Because special knowledge is required to evaluate a medical recommendation, the
committee checking the quality of informed consent may not be able to make this
second determination unless it is composed of physicians. Another possibility is
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statute could list those illnesses-such as acute schizophrenia and

indogenous depression-for which ECT is appropriate.222
C. Incompetent Patientsand Substitute Consent

As discussed earlier, if any one of the three elements of informed
consent--competence, knowledge or voluntariness-is absent, the
consent is not effective. Yet incompetent patients, who may well
need treatment most, cannot give informed consent and the concomitant waiver of constitutional rights.

Most states, therefore, have

adopted legislation that establishes procedures for "substitute consent. 21 23 Usually, a relative, guardian, conservator, committee of
physicians, or court is empowered to perform this function. 22a The
suggested by the new standard 9 in Wyatt v. Hardin, Civ. Action No. 3195-N (M.D.
Ala., Feb. 28, 1975). There, no ECT can be given unless the recommendation for
treatment has been made by a qualified mental health professional, concurred in by a
second qualified mental health professional, and approved by the hospital director.
Whether the determination is to be made by a physician as part of the informed
consent determination of the committee or prior to the patient's consent is surely
within the legislative prerogative. The only requirements should be that those persons
approving the medical appropriateness of the recommendation are qualified to evaluate
the information and that their approval is not a pro forma exercise. To prevent
concurrence in the treating physician's recommendation from being automatically
approved by a colleague, the legislature could require the recommendation, the
reasons given for it, and the approval to be in writing to minimize the potential for
such a concurrence. Other possibilities might include requiring the concurrence of
two doctors or the impartial appointment and rotation of a physician or physicians
to serve in this capacity.
222. But the federal district court in Wyatt has stated:
It must be emphasized at the outset of this order that, in setting forth the minimum constitutional requirements for the employment of certain extraordinary or
potentially hazardous modes of treatment, the court is not undertaking to determine which forms of treatment are appropriate in particular situations. Such
a diagnostic decision is a medical judgment and is not within the province, jurisdiction or expertise of this Court. . . . But the determination of what procedural safeguards must accompany the use of extraordinary or potentially hazardous modes of treatment on patients in the state's mental institutions is a fundamentally legal question ....
Wyatt v. Hardin, Civ. Action No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala., Feb. 28, 1975).
223. See, e.g., Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.7(g) (1976) (WELF. & INST.
CODE). California provides no guidelines to help the surrogate make his decision to
consent for the incompetent patient.
The Wyatt v. Hardin standard, on the other hand, provides that the determination
made by the substitute decision-maker, here the Extraordinary Treatment Committee,
should be based upon a review of pertinent medical, psychiatric, psychological and
social information concerning the patient; an interview with the patient, his family or
others who could contribute relevant information; and the recommendation of a
mental health professional recommending treatment. The standard also provides that
"great weight" shall be given to any expression of the patient of a desire not to be
subjected to ECT. Wyatt v. Hardin, Civ. Action No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala., Feb. 28,
1975). The inclusion of some legislative, or, as in Wyatt, a judicial, expression of
what criteria should make up a best-interests determination is preferred.
224. See, e.g., Cal. Assembly Bill § 5326.7(g) (1976)

(WELF. & INST. CODE);

(involuntary incompetent); Wyatt v. Hardin, Civ. Action No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala.,
Feb. 28, 1975). Cf. Robertson, Organ Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 48, 67-68 (1976).
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consent of the representative must be informed; indeed, to be a valid
waiver of constitutional rights, the consent must be knowingly and
voluntarily given.
If some method of substitute consent is not made available the
alternative is to ban ECT altogether for incompetents. Such a
position is not implausible. It might be argued that a state cannot
constitutionally authorize a third party to consent to ECT for an
incompetent because the potential consequences of ECT are so
severe and its intrusion on the mental process is so great that only
the patient himself should be able to give consent. Although a proponent of this view must concede that a state acting as parens patriae
may authorize certain treatments for incompetent patients, such as
nonpsychiatric or nonintrusive interventions, he would argue that the
purpose of, and risks inherent in, ECT are qualitatively different.
Thus, the state should not be able to provide substitute consent: If
the state lacks a sufficient interest to force competent persons to
receive ECT, 2-5 it likewise does not have a sufficient interest to
"impose" ECT upon nonconsenting incompetents.
On at least two occasions, courts have agreed with this position
and have prevented the administration of intrusive treatments to
incompetents. The first decision that embraced this view was Wyatt
v. Stickney. 226 Although the court would eventually change its
of informed conposition, it initially decided that the requirement
22 7
sent forbade treatment of incompetents:
Patients have a right not to be subjected to treatment procedures such
as lobotomy, electroconvulsive treatment, adversive reinforcement
conditioning or other unusual or hazardous treatment procedures
consultation with
without their express and informed consent after
228
counsel or interested party of the patient's choice.
This position was also adopted in Kaimowitz v. Department of

Mental Health. After deciding that institutionalization diminished
the patient's capacity to consent to irreversible experimental psychosurgery, the court rejected the possibility of substitute consent:
"Although guardian or parental consent may be legally adequate
225. See text at notes 87-97 supra.
226. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd. in part, remanded in part and
revd. in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Anderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
227. "After a thorough consideration of [the] written requests and responses [of
the parties and amici curiae] and the Court's further study of Bryce and Searcy
hospitals' experiences in operating under Standard 9, the Court's of the opinion that a
substantial revision of the present Standard 9 is in order." Wyatt v. Hardin, Civ.
Action No. 3195-N (M.D. Ala., Feb. 28, 1975). The revised standard 9 provided
that patients incompetent to consent could receive ECT after several procedural
requirements, including the determination by the Extraordinary Treatment Committee
that treatment is in the patient's best interest.
228. 344 F. Supp. at 380.
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when arising out of traditional circumstances, it is legally ineffective
in the psychosurgery situation."2 29

However, total prohibition of ECT for incompetents is undesirable.
Although a state does not have a sufficiently compelling interest to
force ECT upon a competent patient, it does not follow that the state
lacks a sufficient interest to provide a mechanism whereby an
incompetent can obtain treatment.

Technically, the incompetent

person cannot refuse treatment because he is incapable of making
a decision. When a representative of the patient makes the decision
to proceed with treatment, the patient's wishes are not overruled.
The representative, in effect, is attempting to approximate the
choice the patient would make if he were competent. Under this

view, substitute consent is not compulsion but rather a mechanism
that makes treatment available and thus is an appropriate device
for the state to utilize.

Moreover, ECT is not a treatment that courts should classify as
being so hazardous that it cannot be administered to incompetents
under any circumstance. There are patients for whom no less
drastic treatment could be effective and for whom ECT offers a chance
of better health. 3 0 Three years after the court in Wyatt v. Stickney
declared that incompetents could not receive ECT, it took notice of
these arguments and established a substitute consent mechanism for

incompetent patients. 231 Its rationale should sustain statutory substitute consent.

Once it is determined that the state may provide for substitute
consent for treatment, the difficult problem of what kind of mecha-

nism best represents the patient's interests remains.

A relative of

229. 2 Prison L. Rptr. 433, 476 (1976). It may be significant that both cases
involved psychosurgery and not ECT. Psychosurgery may be deemed more intrusive
than ECT, and substituted consent may be allowed for ECT but not surgery. For
example, California's new legislation requires consent from the patient himself for
psychosurgery and provides no mechanism for substituted consent so that an incompetent patient can receive it. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.6 (1976) (WELF. &
INST. CODE). However, a substituted consent mechanism is provided for ECT.
230. This position is reflected in the California requirement that ECT be used
only after all other treatment modalities had been considered. See Cal. Assembly Bill
No. 1032, §§ 5326.7(a) & 5326.75(a) (1976) (Welf. & Inst. Code).
231. See note 227 supra. The Wyatt v. Hardin procedure is similar to that
promulgated in Price v. Sheppard. Attempting to respect the integrity of the patient
without denying him potentially beneficial treatment, the Wyatt court established the
Extraordinary Treatment Committee and empowered it to make best interest determinations for incompetents. It also imposed three conditions on the committee's
ability to order treatment. First, the patient must be represented by counsel at all
proceedings and deliberations. Second, all doubts about the wisdom of ECT must be
resolved against authorizing the treatment. Finally, if the committee does conclude
that ECT should be administered, the patient or a relative can appeal the decision. A
legislature might also require that there be additional verification that ECT is
medically indicated and that the person(s) exercising the consent are subject to the
consent requirements imposed on competent persons. See, e.g., Cal. Assembly Bill
No. 1032, § 5326.7(g) (1976) (WELF. & INST. CODE).
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the patient has traditionally been recognized as an appropriate
surrogate.2 2 However, several commentators have recently observed that a relative-particularly a close one-may not be the
person best qualified to make a judgment for the patient:23 3 The
Minnesota Supreme Court, cognizant of this problem, has concluded
that those individuals responsible for the patient's commitment-frequently relatives-cannot represent the patient's interests in the
adjudicatory hearing where the decision whether to administer ECT
is made.2 3 a If a relative is allowed to substitute his consent for that
of the patient, the relative's decision should be subjected to the same
scrutiny as the consent of a competent patient. Whatever disclosures would have been made to a competent patient should also
be made to the relative. Just as an inquiry is made into whether
a physician is coercing a patient's consent, the same inquiry should
be made into whether the physician is pressuring the relative to give
consent by, for example, conditioning or threatening to condition the
patient's release upon their consent. If no relative is available, some
statutes allow a court to designate a representative who may be able
either to give consent himself or to ask the court for an order authorizing treatment.23 5 Some statutes allow such a representative
even though a relative is available. 23 6 This procedure may be
unwise; a relative should at least be allowed to challenge the decision
of the court-appointed representative in an adjudicatory hearing.
D.

Summary

When the decision-making process for the administration of ECT
has been challenged in court, courts have typically devised methods
to protect the rights of mental patients. They have frequently concluded that a pretreatment review mechanism is the best means of
helping to ensure both the validity of a competent patient's consent
and the desirability of treating an incompetent patient. Not
232. W. PROSSER, supra note 54 at 102-03.
233. In particular, conflicts of interest have been recognized in parental decisionmaking for children. Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of Minors
to Mental Institutions,62 CALIF. L. REv. 840, 850-51, 857-59 (1974).
234. Price v. Sheppard, - Minn. at -, 239 N.W.2d at 913 n.11. California
avoids a conflict of interest by providing that no one serving on a review committee
can be otherwise personally involved in the treatment of the patient whose case he is
reviewing. Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1032, § 5326.55 (1976) (WELF. & INST. CODE).
Similarly, a recent Tennessee statute provides for a lawyer to represent minors who
need ECT but prohibits the appointment of any lawyer who has advised the party
seeking authorization of ECT for the minor, who has advised the minor's parents, or
who is connected with a parent's business. Tennessee Public Act of 1976, ch. 489,
§ l(c).
235. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-206d (West Supp. 1977).
236. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-206d (West Supp. 1977).
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surprisingly, a number of states have adopted legislation that requires for all cases of ECT administration many of the same procedures already developed by the courts. These statutes raise many
questions, the most crucial of which have been analyzed above.
Undoubtedly, other questions will eventually be raised as legislatures
seek to devise new ways to protect the rights of mental patients.
Nevertheless, much of the analysis of the issues presented by current
statutes may well be useful in resolving these developing, but related,
questions.

